

**“ NUNC IGITUR, NUNC CÆLO ITERUM VICTRICIA SIGNA
(RES EGET HIS ARMIS ET BELLATORIBUS ISTIS)
ELEVA, ET ACCELERA PUGILES ARMARE BRITANNOS.”**

BAPTISTA MANTUANUS.

ANNALS
OF THE
PENINSULAR CAMPAIGNS,
FROM
MDCCCVIII TO MDCCCXIV.

BY THE AUTHOR OF CYRIL THORNTON.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

WILLIAM BLACKWOOD, EDINBURGH: AND
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MDCCCXXIX.

P R E F A C E.

IN offering the following volumes to the Public, the Author would by no means be understood as courting any competition with the more able and elaborate works of his contemporaries. To all the British historians of the Peninsular War, he has been largely indebted, and it would ill become him to speak of their labours, otherwise than with respect: The works of Colonel Jones, and Colonel Napier, display a very high degree of talent and ingenuity; and that of Mr. Southey, considered as a vast magazine of facts, laboriously collected, and embodied in a narrative of uniform clearness, may be considered as a valuable addition to our literature.

Yet, admitting the merit of these writers, it appeared to the author, that their accounts of the Peninsular War were calculated rather for the closet of the professional student, than for the great mass of the public, who are little likely to feel interested in any dry or lengthened detail of accessory incidents, or to enter very deeply into the intricacies of military discussion; and that there was still wanting a work which should introduce to the intimate acquaintance of the great body of the people, the events of one of the most memorable periods in the history of their country, which should diffuse and imprint, more widely and more deeply, a fitting pride in the great achievements of the British arms, and render Englishmen more familiar with the circumstances of the most splendid and important triumph ever gained by the supporters of liberty, justice, and the rights of man, in opposing the gigantic usurpation of wild and profligate ambition.

To furnish such a work has been the object of the author of these Annals. That he has succeeded he cannot flatter himself; yet he trusts that he has at least deserved the credit of having detailed the occurrences of the war with fairness and impartiality; and that he has, in no instance, made his work subservient to the dictates of national bigotry or unworthy prejudice.

To any peculiar qualifications for the task he has undertaken, the author of these volumes makes no pretension. A few years of his early life were spent in the army—when he had the good fortune to be present in some of the great battles which it has now fallen to him to describe. He was thus enabled to acquire, by personal observation, a knowledge of many important localities, which he trusts will occasionally be found to have produced a beneficial influence on his narrative. Of any other advantages he is unaware; and the circumstance of the present work being given anony-

mously to the world, may be taken as an acknowledgment that the opinions which it contains could derive nothing of authority from the name of its author. Were it otherwise, however, he would prefer that these opinions should stand or fall without extrinsic support ; and he is aware of none which he is not prepared to relinquish, whenever, by more able reasoners, they shall be shown to be erroneous.

In a work embracing so vast a variety of detail, it is scarcely possible to hope that complete accuracy has been attained. The author trusts, however, that he will be found to have fallen into few important errors ; and he submits the present work to the judgment of the public, not with confidence certainly, but with no wish to deprecate the severity of any censure to which it may be found liable.

Toulouse, 2d September, 1829.

NOTE.

IN the first volume will be found references to an Appendix which does not exist. It has been omitted, on the ground that the documents referred to were easy of access, and not sufficiently important to warrant the addition of another volume, which the introduction of an Appendix would have rendered necessary.

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ERRATA.

Vol. 3, page 127, line 2d, for “western” read eastern.

Do. do. line 4th, for “east and south-east” read west and south-west.



ANNALS
OF THE
PENINSULAR CAMPAIGNS.

CHAPTER I.

HISTORICAL RETROSPECT.

THE Annals of neighbouring nations seldom pre- CHAP. I.
sent a contrast more striking, than that exhibited
by the History of France and Spain, for the
twenty years preceding the commencement of
the Peninsular War. During that period, France
had become the theatre of a vast and terrible
revolution ; the whole fabric of her government
had been overthrown ; society had been re-
duced to its original elements ; and, amid tor-
rents of blood shed on field and scaffold, she

VOL. I.

A

CHAP. I. had passed from despotism to anarchy, and from
anarchy had again subsided into despotism.

These mighty changes had not flowed slowly onward, borne as it were on the progressive current of events, into gradual and almost imperceptible development. They had at once burst on the world, in all the suddenness and terror of the earthquake or the tornado. Their causes, it is true, had been long in operation, but they had wrought in secrecy and silence; and mankind stood aghast at a catastrophe so unlooked-for and appalling, whose overwhelming force and magnitude seemed to set all human efforts to impede its progress at defiance.

It was impossible that the consequences of so tremendous a convulsion should be confined to France: they were felt in every zone and region of the earth. Kings trembled on their thrones, and nobles in their palaces; while nations, partaking of the endemic delirium of the hour, were prepared to burst the chains which had hitherto enthralled them, and hail the advent of that political millennium, which they imagined had already dawned in hurricane and tempest.

All the governments of Europe became par-

takers, in a large degree, of the general alarm; CHAP. I.
and endeavoured, with natural anxiety, to avoid
being drawn into a vortex so wide and over-
whelming. In community of interest they found
a common bond of union; and war was resorted
to, as the only means of escape from those
dangers, the near approach of which they had
witnessed with dismay. A general confederacy
of the European monarchies was formed against
France, and the restoration of the Bourbons to
the throne, was the avowed end to which the
hostilities of the alliance were directed.

To such an interference in her domestic gov-
ernment, it was not to be expected that France
would tamely submit. Though torn by the
strife of faction, and distracted by internal con-
vulsion, she displayed, in her relations with
foreign powers, a vigour, a fearlessness, and a
promptitude to repel or retaliate aggression,
which the feebleness and insecurity of her go-
vernment at home gave little reason to expect.
In the war which followed, the star of France
prevailed, and that of the Allies grew dim be-
fore it. The energies of the Republic, under
the guidance of the great military leaders
whom the revolution had called from obscur-

CHAP. I. ity to stations of prominence and command,

were directed against her enemies with decided vigour and success. The league was soon broken; one by one the members of the Alliance were encountered and overthrown; and, on the return of peace, France, triumphant at all points, remained undisputed mistress of a large accession of territory, and of an 'almost overwhelming influence in the whole political relations of continental Europe.

Great Britain alone remained among her enemies, unhumbled and unsubdued. Mistress of the sea, while the arms of France were everywhere triumphant on land, it seemed as if earth and ocean were divided against each other, in vast and interminable conflict. While the boundaries of their respective elements seemed to assign to either belligerent his peculiar sphere of triumph, and to prescribe the limits of his sway, there existed few points of contact on which the strength of these mighty combatants could be matched in final and decisive struggle. Each seemed armed against his enemy in mail of impenetrable proof; and France having succeeded in compelling the continental powers to withdraw from their alliance with England, the

war gradually degenerated on both sides, into a CHAP. I.
war of petty enterprises, attended only by com-
paratively unimportant results.

In the meantime, the power of France, which, from the period of the Revolution, had been progressively increasing, had become apparently consolidated by time and conquest. Her government had at length assumed a form of sufficient permanence and consistency, to warrant an expectation, on the part of England, that the national faith, if solemnly pledged by treaty, would not, as heretofore, be sacrificed to popular clamour, or be disregarded amid the strife of contending factions. It was, at least, obvious to all reasonable observers, that whatever changes the internal government of France might yet be destined to undergo, these could proceed only from within, and could neither be accelerated nor retarded by hostile aggression from without. Both parties had, in truth, become tired of a contest which occasioned a continued outpouring of blood and treasure, but which held out to neither, any prospect of a brilliant or advantageous result. Pacific overtures were made and accepted; and, by the conclusion of the treaty of Amiens, the sword was again returned to its scabbard, and the

1803.

CHAP. I. world, for a brief interval, enjoyed tranquillity
— and repose.

While France had thus become the theatre, not only of a political, but of a mighty moral revolution, and was exercising an irresistible control on the destinies of Europe, Spain had partaken in nothing of the intellectual vigour and advancement which had long exerted a silent but powerful influence on the surrounding nations. The moral energy, the proud and chivalrous gallantry, the spirit of heroic enterprise, by which, in the better and brighter ages of her history, her character was so strongly marked, had, for centuries, been gradually on the decline; and the Spanish people, long habituated to despotism both political and religious, were still surrounded by an atmosphere of bigotry and darkness, which the light, dawning in the intellectual horizon of other nations, had been unable to penetrate. In the case of Spain, ignorance and misgovernment had produced their natural effect; and, notwithstanding the formidable magnitude of her physical resources, she had gradually fallen from the prominent station she once held in the foremost rank of European nations, to that of a secondary power.

During the greater part of the reign of Charles the Third, the government of Spain had followed the true policy, dictated at once by her geographical position, and her deficiency in offensive power, in withdrawing, as much as possible, from all participation in the contests in which the other nations of Europe were embroiled. Bounded by France on the north, and on the east and south by the sea, the acquisition of Portugal and Gibraltar were the only projects of European aggrandizement to which the ambition of her rulers could be rationally extended; and, in the execution of such schemes of conquest, she could not but be aware that the whole maritime and military force of England would be exerted in opposition to her views. England, therefore, she had been accustomed to regard as the chief obstacle to the success of her ambition; and, actuated by dislike, heightened perhaps by difference of religion, commercial jealousies, and the great naval superiority of Britain, the government of Spain had been uniformly more prompt to engage in hostilities with that power, than any other with whom, in the occasional jarring of interest or policy, she might be brought into collision. France, on the other hand,

CHAP. I. was naturally indicated, by her power and proximity, either as the most powerful ally of Spain, or her most formidable enemy. Through France alone was the Spanish territory vulnerable to the rest of Europe; while no alliance with other powers could afford protection from her hostility.

Under the ministry of Florida Blanca, Spain, instigated by France, had taken part in the war between Great Britain and her colonies, and made a vigorous attempt to regain the fortress of Gibraltar. In this she failed; and, after a protracted war, in which her best energies had been exhausted with inadequate effect, she at length retired from a contest, of which the only favourable result was the restoration of Minorca and the Floridas.

1783. Immediately before the breaking out of the French Revolution, Charles the Fourth, by the death of his father, had succeeded to the throne of Spain. Alarmed, in common with other sovereigns, at the new and startling doctrines, both political and religious, of which the revolutionary government proclaimed itself at once the partisan and the apostle, Charles acceded to the general confederacy then forming in Europe,

and declared war against France. In the hostilities which followed, Spain was eminently unsuccessful, and compelled to act only on the defensive. The army of the Republic crossed the Pyrenees, reduced the fortresses of San Fernando de Figueras and St. Sebastian, and, after defeating the Spanish force in several engagements, became masters of the Biscayan provinces and the kingdom of Navarre. Charles, who saw with dismay the whole northern portion of his kingdom already in possession of the enemy, hastened to supplicate for peace. The prayer of the Spanish monarch was granted by the Republic ; and, by the treaty of Basle, Charles was again restored to the sovereignty of his conquered provinces, on condition of his relinquishing to France the Spanish portion of St. Domingo.

1795.
July 22.

Once more at peace, and relieved from the fear of present invasion, the government of Spain lost no time in disbanding her armies, and resigning herself to the enjoyment of an insecure and defenceless repose. While the whole population of France were training to the use of arms, the Spanish monarch, by a sort of inexplicable fatuity, was depressing the military spirit of his people, and depriving himself of all means of prompt

CHAP. I. and efficacious resistance to future encroachment or invasion. No measures were taken to strengthen his northern frontier, or to repair the fortresses which had become dilapidated by the operations of the late war; and all the precautions necessary for the future security of his kingdom were neglected. The dreamy tranquillity of Charles, however, was not destined to be of long duration. Having placed himself at the mercy of France, he was speedily called on to take part in the war which that country was again waging against England. The consequence was that the naval power of Spain was encountered and overthrown, that her commerce was ruined, her treasury drained of its resources, and the intercourse with her colonies rendered precarious and uncertain.

The peace of Amiens, which had been regarded by either party as little more than a temporary cessation of hostilities, was, as if by mutual consent, soon broken. France and England, the rival and gigantic powers into whose hands were committed the destinies of the world, had again unsheathed the sword; and it depended on the issue of the approaching conflict, whether the chains, by which Europe was already encircled,

should be riveted or snapped in twain. In such circumstances, it was the natural policy of Spain to have remained neutral. In common with the other weaker countries of Europe, she would gladly have kept aloof from a contest which involved the certainty of immediate sacrifice, while its eventual advantages were only distant and contingent. In a war, however, of such a character, and with objects so vast as the liberation or subjection of the world, it was not to be expected that the rights of neutral powers should be held sacred and inviolate. To remain neutral was, in truth, to encounter all the hazards and sacrifices of war, without participation of its benefits ; and the minor states of Europe soon found themselves absorbed in the eddies of a whirlpool, and carried involuntarily forward by an impetus, at once rapid and resistless.

CHAP. I.

1804.

It was not long before the eyes of Spain were opened to the bold and decisive policy of the belligerents. While yet at peace with both parties, four Spanish frigates, loaded with treasure from America, were captured by an English squadron, without any declaration of war. By this flagrant act of national piracy, Spain was at once driven into the arms of France, and war against

Oct. 5.

CHAP. I. Great Britain immediately declared. She saw that, for a mean and unwarrantable purpose, she had been made the object not merely of robbery but of insult; and the unprincipled aggression of England drew from the whole Spanish nation a burst of indignant hatred, which the policy of France led her, by every means, to cherish and prolong.

1805. The throne of France was now filled by Napoleon; and the ascendancy of his master-mind contributed to rivet yet more strongly the fetters by which Spain was already shackled. The tone at first assumed by the new Emperor, was intended to lull the Spanish government into still deeper security; and it succeeded. Assurances of friendship, and promises of support, were made with a profusion, and an apparent warmth which seemed to warrant their sincerity; and they were received by Charles, with a credulity quite in harmony with the general imbecility of his character.

The minister to whose hands the reins of government had long been intrusted, was Don Manuel Godoy; and surely never was there a servant less qualified by character and talents, to compensate for the deficiencies of his master.

Raised by the illicit attachment of the Queen CHAP. I.
from the situation of a private gentleman to the
highest rank and office of the state, he brought
to the task of governing a great nation, a narrow
and uncultivated mind, a grovelling and selfish
spirit. He was a man alike devoid of principle
and firmness ; and the only proof of talent exhibited in his unfortunate career, must be sought in the ascendancy, which, under every change of circumstance, he appears to have maintained over the minds of Charles and his consort. By their favour he was first created Duc d'Alcudia, and afterwards, in honour of the treaty of Basle, which he had been chiefly instrumental in concluding, Principe de la Paz. To his hands were committed the direction and patronage of all the departments of the state. Every honour in the power of the monarch to bestow was lavished on the favourite. By his marriage with Marie Therese de Bourbon, the niece of Charles, he was elevated to the rank of royalty ; and the state and magnificence of his establishment were such as had never before been affected by a subject.

Some men there are, who, when called on by events*to figure in a new and higher sphere of

CHAP. I. action than that for which they were originally
 1805. destined, experience a proportionate expansion
 of intellect and power—in whom new energies
 are elicited by the dangers and the difficulties,
 which, perhaps by a wise dispensation, are
 fated to surround and darken the paths of glory
 and ambition. Such a man was *not* Godoy.
 In him power called only into development the
 baser and more grovelling passions of his na-
 ture, while all the higher impulses by which
 humanity is graced and ennobled, slept on in
 undisturbed repose. Under the sway of such
 a person it was impossible that Spain should pros-
 per. The honour of the country was sacrificed,
 her vital interests were disregarded, and the whole
 functions of the government of a great nation
 were made to converge towards a single point—
 the gratification of an unprincipled favourite.

It is scarcely impossible to conceive a court
 more thoroughly dissolute and degraded than that
 of Madrid under the administration of Godoy.
 Those only received his favours who pandered to
 his vices; and all in any degree distinguished by
 wisdom, virtue, or patriotism, were treated with
 contumely and neglect. It has been said that
 he was corrupted by France; yet, there are many

portions of his public conduct and policy at variance with such a supposition. Godoy's was not a lofty ambition: the rank, the wealth, the power he already enjoyed, afforded ample means of sordid gratification, and engrossed the capacities of his nature. France had no bribe of magnitude sufficient to secure the services of a man whose highest aspirations were already sated, to whom future glory, when weighed against present enjoyment, was but as dust in the balance.

CHAP. I.

1805.

For some benefits, however, and these of no trifling magnitude, it is but justice to confess that Spain has been indebted to the administration of Godoy. He increased and accelerated the impulse of the national industry by patronage and encouragement. He extended his protection to artists and men of science; and it was in a great measure through his influence and exertions that vaccination became general in Spain, and was subsequently communicated to her possessions in America. Under his administration the Inquisition lost its terrors; works of national utility were encouraged and promoted; and vigorous and judicious measures were adopted to prevent the dissemination of infectious disease.

- CHAP. I. Let the censures of the historian, therefore, on the character of Godoy be severe but discriminating. 1805. While he displays the darker and more prominent features of his character in their true colours, let him also do justice to those better qualities, by which, in other circumstances, it might have been brightened and redeemed.

Of Charles it would be yet greater injustice to speak in terms of unmitigated reproach. None of the elements of greatness were mingled in his composition, and his virtues and his vices were alike those of an imbecile intellect. Naturally timid and irresolute, yet of a character in which was mingled much of kindness and benevolence, Charles, had his lot been cast in calmer and more peaceful times, might have reigned in tranquil insignificance, by no means unfavourably distinguished among the tenants of the Spanish throne. But his powers were prodigiously disproportioned to the task imposed on him by the irresistible progress of events. With favouring breezes, and on a summer sea, he might have guided the vessel of the state prosperously on her voyage; but when the elements were abroad in their discord, it required another and more powerful arm, to steer her safely into port.

It was impossible for any minister to be more generally unpopular than Godoy. The ancient nobility regarded him as an upstart; and were alike indignant at his elevation and jealous of his power. By the people at large he was considered the source of all the misfortunes and the degradation by which, since his accession to power, the Spanish name and arms had been stained and humbled. The party thus opposed to the favourite, though strong in numbers were yet stronger in the rank and influence of their leader. Ferdinand Prince of Asturias, the heir-apparent to the throne, had naturally regarded the elevation of Godoy with indignation and disgust. His sentiments were no sooner known than the party opposed to the minister rallied round him as their leader. Under any other than a despotic government it would have been impossible for Godoy to have retained his situation in opposition to the public voice. He must at once have been driven into retirement with ignominy and disgrace. But it is not the least disadvantage of an absolute and unmitigated monarchy, that it is cut off from all sympathy and communion with the people; that the governors and the governed are not "bound, each to each, by natural sympathy;" that the

CHAP. I.

1805.

CHAP. I. portents of approaching eclipse are unscen or dis-
regarded, till the earth is shrouded in darkness,

1805. and monarchs are "perplexed by fear of change,"
which it is no longer in their power to avert.

1806. In 1806 the disorders of the government had at length reached their height: the army, unpaid and without equipment, was clamorous and undisciplined; the navy, which in the preceding reign was formidable, both in point of numbers and efficiency, had been annihilated at Trafalgar; the finances were deranged; the treasury exhausted; and commerce, by the war with England, almost utterly destroyed. Spain had in truth become a mere dependent on France; and the French ruler, far from compassionating her difficulties, still continued to exact fresh sacrifices, and compliances more humble.

Godoy was now fully aware of the perils of his situation; and, could Spain, by any peaceful effort of diplomacy, have been detached from her dangerous and inglorious dependence on France, he would gladly have again raised her from thralldom, and have unbound the ignoble shackles from her limbs. But the difficulties of his situation had become far beyond his feeble powers to overcome. On the one hand, the neg-

lect of all warlike preparation on the part of Spain, the dilapidated state of her frontier fortresses, the total want of the munitions necessary for the defence of her territory if subjected to invasion, withheld him from openly adopting any measure which might incur the hostility of France. On the other hand, from the advanced age of the king, and the aversion of the heir-apparent, he could not but contemplate the probability of a speedy termination to his power. He naturally feared the hostility of an injured people, and dreaded the arrival of the moment when, no longer protected by the shield of regal authority, he should be left the defenceless object of popular indignation.

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1806.

Stimulated by such fears, Godoy felt it necessary to conciliate public opinion, by the adoption of some immediate measure in unison with the general feeling of the nation. He accordingly proceeded to concert with the Russian and Portuguese ambassadors at Madrid, a plan of combined aggression on the territory of France. The details of this project it is now curious to contemplate. It was proposed that hostile preparations should be made simultaneously at numerous and distant points, and should be conducted

CHAP. I. with such secrecy as to elude the observation of
1806. Napoleon, then actively engaged in the war with Prussia. Spain and Portugal were to unite their forces against the common enemy. Arrangements were to be made for assembling a large army in the ports of Great Britain, which, on a given signal, was to be landed on the north of Spain. The operations on land were to be supported by a naval armament of overwhelming magnitude ; and, by a simultaneous movement in the north of Europe, Russia was to advance to the relief of Germany, with her whole military power.

In such circumstances, before the armies of Napoleon, engaged in distant operations, could be concentrated for the defence of the kingdom, the allies were unexpectedly to cross the Pyrenees, and, marching direct for Paris, to gain possession of the capital. By these measures it was conceived, that a sudden and decisive blow would be struck in the vital part where France was at once most vulnerable and defenceless.

Such were the projects of the Prince of Peace ; and small as the chance might be of maturing, under any circumstances, a scheme so widely ramified, and depending on so many contingencies

for its completion, without exciting the suspicions of Napoleon, all hope of success was at once blighted by his own rashness and precipitation.

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1805.

Before any of the necessary arrangements had been made, nay even before the powers most interested had been apprized of the part allotted to them in the projected scheme of hostilities, a proclamation was issued by Godoy, exhorting all loyal Spaniards to take arms, and rally round the throne of their sovereign. Circular letters were written to the bishops and civil functionaries of the provinces, urging them to excite the ardour of the people in the cause of their country. The nation, thus called on to defend their sovereign, could perceive no new danger which threatened his throne. The manifesto indicated no enemy against whom they were to arm. They were told of no insult or aggression which it had become necessary to repress or to revenge. The dangers of which it spoke were too indefinite and shadowy to rouse the fears or passions of the people. Its motives and its ends were alike veiled in an obscurity they were unable to penetrate. The nation wondered and were silent.

Oct. 5.

The astonishment excited by this warlike demonstration was not confined to Spain. Europe was

CHAP. I. unprepared for the loud note of gratuitous defiance
1806. so suddenly sounded from Madrid. No alliance had been formed, no treaty concluded, no preparation made for any combined attack on the power of France. Even the ministers of Spain at the foreign courts, were left wholly in the dark as to the views and projects of Godoy. The Russian and Portuguese ambassadors on the appearance of this unseasonable proclamation, lost no time in attempting to vindicate themselves from the suspicion of a connivance, which could not fail to draw down upon their governments the indignation of Napoleon. They denied being privy to its contents, and carefully avoided committing themselves, by any future negotiations, to the discretion of a man so manifestly deficient in all the qualities of a statesman.

It was upon the field of Jena that Napoleon received this proclamation—with what feelings may readily be conceived. That which to Europe appeared vague and mysterious, to him was abundantly intelligible. He at once appreciated the policy of Charles and his minister; and then it was, as he afterwards declared, that he first resolved on the subjugation of the Peninsula.

In the meanwhile, the French Ambassador at Madrid presented an indignant remonstrance on the perfidious and vacillating policy of the Spanish government ; and Godoy, anxious to escape if possible from the consequences of his rashness, replied by humble assurances that the warlike preparations called for by the proclamation, were intended as a mere defensive measure against the Emperor of Morocco, who, instigated by the intrigues, and emboldened by the protection of England, might possibly attempt a descent on Andalusia. Napoleon, still engaged in a contest which required a concentration of his resources, deemed it politic to receive this lame and improbable explanation as satisfactory. His vows of vengeance slept ; but they were soon destined to awake from slumber.

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1807.

The peace of Tilsit, which speedily followed these events, left the French Emperor at full liberty to pursue his ambitious projects with regard to the Peninsula. He assembled a large army on the Garonne, and weakened the defensive powers of Spain, by exacting still larger drafts from her army than she had yet been called on to furnish. Sixteen thousand of her best-disciplined troops, under the command

August.

CHAP. I. of the Marquis de Romana, were marched into

1807. the north of Germany, and another division were
employed in the occupation of Etruria. While
matters were thus silently but rapidly verging
toward the catastrophe, Napoleon continued to
express his approbation of the conduct of Charles,
and to lavish testimonies of his favour on Godoy.
Whether the Spanish monarch and his minion
were really deceived by these hollow appearances
of esteem, it would boot little to ascertain. They
were already in the net of the spoiler, and so
involved in its multiplied convolutions that es-
cape was impossible.

No submission, however abject, no resistance,
however prompt and energetic, could possibly
have rescued Spain. It is not improbable that the
fall of the Bourbons had already been decreed.
Accustomed as Napoleon had been to the en-
joyments of gratified ambition, he felt perhaps
a new excitement to his pride in the idea that
the plebeian brows of a scion of his house, should
be graced by one of the highest and most ancient
crowns of Europe. It was yet something to a
spirit like his, to raise to the level of the no-
blest of the earth all those whose veins were
filled with blood kindred to his own. It was

yet more than this, by a striking act of violent and decisive volition, to prove to Europe, that henceforward her law was to be found in the arbitrary fiat of her master. But it was most of all to beat down, and trample in the dust, the descendants of an hundred kings; to display the full measure of his contempt for those hereditary prejudices, before which the world had hitherto bent in reverence and submission; to stand forth in the indefeasible dignity of his own majestic spirit, with all the moral and intrinsic attributes of sovereignty concentrated in his person, as the man, marked out by nature, whose brow could alone support the diadem, or whose arm could wield the sceptre of the world.

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1807.

Whether the course of Napoleon, with regard to Spain, was influenced by the instigations of an ambition so wild and reckless, is one of those problems probably never destined to be solved. It is at least certain, there were other motives, and those of cogency more powerful and immediate, to urge him forward on that course of policy which was to terminate in the deposition of the Bourbons.

In deciding on the immediate annexation of Spain, as an appanage of his empire, Napoleon,

CHAP. I. by many of the political reasoners of the day, has
1807. been held guilty, not only of an unprincipled outrage on the law of nations, but of being influenced in his proceedings towards that power, by the mere blind and vague stimulus of conquest. "Spain," say such reasoners, "feeble and inoffensive, was already in his power. Her troops had fought in the same ranks with his own; her resources had been drained to enrich his treasury, and were still at his command. What then had he to gain by outraging the feelings of a people so little capable of disturbing his security, or by deposing a dynasty which he could bend so easily to all the purposes of his ambition?"

The answer is, *much*. Over such a monarch as Charles, and such a minister as Godoy, Napoleon well knew he could exercise no ascendancy but that of fear. While his armies continued to advance, as they had hitherto done, in the career of conquest, he had nothing to dread from Spain, and he had dreaded nothing. But he also well knew, that, should the tide of battle change, should the flood of success, on which he had hitherto floated on from attack to victory—from victory to conquest, ebb again from beneath him, Spain would be among the first of the

surrounding nations to unsheath the sword, and raise the battle-cry on his declining fortunes. The proclamation of Godoy had given sufficient indication of her future policy, should adverse contingencies occur to shake the stability of his government, or weaken its power.

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Had the views of Napoleon, therefore, been directed merely to the present, he could have beheld, in the degraded state of the Peninsula, nothing to excite his alarm. But, regarding the future security of a widely extended empire, he could scarcely fail to consider the acquisition of Spain, as a measure essential to its permanence. The vast increase of territory which France had acquired by conquest, in Italy, and beyond the Rhine, rendered it necessary to her safety, that the circuit of her dominion should be proportionably enlarged in those quarters from which, by a sudden and unexpected invasion, an army might advance into the very centre of the kingdom. On this subject the reasoning of General Foy appears unanswerable:—"Spain presses on France," says that able—would we could likewise add impartial and unprejudiced—writer, "in a way which differs wholly from every other pressure. Surrounded by the sea, and in contact only with a feeble neigh-

CHAP. I. bour, Spain has nothing to fear from any lateral
1807. aggression, and, should she become the enemy
of France, can bear down with all her strength
on the northern frontier.—Napoleon knew, that
behind the Pyrenees a generous nation had
preserved its energy, and had not sunk into de-
gradation, even under the long oppression of a
government inglorious abroad and despotic at
home. He knew all that might be expected
from the people, and especially from the peo-
ple of the south, when governed in unison
with their passions, and within the sphere of
their moral impressions. A man might arise
who would regenerate Spain; a prince might
reign, who would suffer it to be regenerated; a
palace revolution, a popular tumult, might give
the impulse. It was not written in the book of
fate, that Spain should be always ruled by a weak
king, a shameless queen, and a contemptible fav-
ourite. While the eagles of France were flying
to the banks of the Danube, and urging their
course towards the Vistula, an enemy was at
her gates on the south. The empire, which is
so deeply vulnerable on one point, is strong no
where. The increase of territory ought to be
effected by concentric additions, and simultane-

ously on all sides. The French armies, when fighting in Poland, Bohemia, and Austria, might be turned by an enemy's army which presented itself on the frontier of the Pyrenees, because that army would be the nearest to Paris. The centre of a kingdom is, in fact, the arc and buttress of its military power. Was not, then, the absolute and firmly-guaranteed submission of Spain, a natural and necessary consequence of the extension of France beyond her natural limits, the Alps and the Rhine? Such were the thoughts suggested to Napoleon by the idle proclamation of Godoy."

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The first step taken by Napoleon towards the completion of his project, was to induce Charles, through the agency of his minister, to become a party to a secret treaty which was signed at Fontainebleau. By this instrument the partition of Portugal was agreed on. The province Entre Minho et Douro was to be erected into a separate sovereignty for the king of Etruria, whose Italian dominions were to be ceded to France. The Alentejo and Algarva were allotted as the reward of Godoy, to whom they were conveyed as a separate and independent principality. It was likewise stipulated that the sovereignty

App. No. 1.
Oct. 27.

CHAP. I. of the other provinces of Portugal should rest in

1807. abeyance, till the termination of the war; then
to be restored conditionally to the House of Bra-
ganza, or otherwise disposed of, as the plea-
sure of the contracting powers might dictate.
It was further agreed, that the colonies of Por-
tugal should be divided between the sovereigns,
on the principle of an equal partition.

Such were the more prominent features of the
treaty of Fontainebleau; and on the same day on
App. No. 2. which it was concluded, a convention was likewise
signed, for carrying it into effect. By this it was
arranged, that a body of twenty-five thousand
French infantry, and, three thousand cavalry,
should enter Spain, and marching directly on
Lisbon, were there to be reinforced by the junc-
tion of a Spanish army of twelve thousand men.
The troops of Charles were at the same time
to take possession of the province Entre Minho
et Douro, and the city of Oporto; while a
third division was to reduce and hold in occu-
pation the provinces south of the Tagus. It
was likewise provided by the convention, that
the French troops should, on their march, be
furnished with all necessary supplies, at the ex-
pense of the Spanish government.

Though the contracting powers appear to have contemplated little probable opposition, to this scheme of iniquitous spoliation, yet, in order to repel any possible attempts of the English to obstruct its execution, it was agreed that an army of reserve of forty thousand men, should assemble at Bayonne, ready to march to the defence of any point which might be menaced with attack.

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The secrecy with which they were concluded is not one of the least remarkable circumstances connected with the treaty and convention of Fontainebleau. The negotiations on the part of Spain were conducted by Don Eugenio Izquierdo, a person uninvested with any public character, but enjoying the full confidence of Godoy. Of the powers intrusted to Izquierdo by the King and his minister, the Spanish Ambassador at Paris was kept in profound ignorance. All the diplomatic arrangements connected with the treaty, were concluded without his knowledge ; nor was it till several of the stipulations had been carried into effect that he first became acquainted with its existence. The instructions which Izquierdo received personally from the King, preparatory to his departure, are sufficiently illustrative both of the feeble character of Charles and his

CHAP. I. unbounded reliance on Godoy, to merit record.

1807. “*Manuel es tu protector,*” said the monarch,
 “*tras quando te diga ; por medio suyo debes*
servir me.”*

Of Portugal it is now time to speak. Engaged in the peaceful prosecution of an extended commerce, and relying for security on the faith of a treaty of neutrality—the advantages of which were purchased by a large annual tribute to France,—her government had abstained, as much as possible, from mingling in the dissensions of the more powerful nations of Europe. Towards Spain, she had been guilty of no offence ; and connected with that power by public alliance, and multiplied intermarriages with the reigning family, the Prince of Brazil imagined that if not entirely secure from insult or partial injustice, his territory was at least safe from glaring outrage and spoliation. He certainly did not, and could not anticipate, that the inoffensive policy of his government, could be followed, on the part of his allies, by an act of power so flagrant and un-

* “Manuel Godoy is thy protector. Do what he orders thee. It is through him that thou must serve me.” These are the very words of Charles, given in the correspondence of Izquierdo.

justifiable as that contemplated by the stipulations of the treaty of Fontainebleau. CHAP. I.

The peace of Tilsit had scarcely been concluded, when the French and Spanish ambassadors at Lisbon united in a formal demand, that the ports of the kingdom should be instantly closed against England, that the ships then in harbour should be seized, and the property of all British subjects confiscated. It was likewise intimated to the government of Portugal, that, in case the requisition of the ambassadors was not followed by an immediate compliance, a speedy declaration of war by both powers would be the inevitable consequence. 1807.
Aug.
App. No. 3.

The Prince Regent, unwilling to become the instrument of injustice towards an old and faithful ally, endeavoured, by a temporizing policy, to avert the necessity of immediate acquiescence in this unprincipled demand. He signified to the Court of France his readiness to prevent all future intercourse with England, but objected to the more violent measures prescribed for his adoption. Aware, perhaps, how little weight would be attached by those whom he addressed, to any collateral appeal to justice or the law of nations, the Prince Regent urged, as

CHAP. I. the chief motive for the line of policy he was

1807. anxious to pursue, the fact that a Portuguese
squadron was then cruising in the Mediterranean,
and the prudence of maintaining terms
with England till it had returned to port.

The feebleness of Portugal, however, rendered all the remonstrances of her government ineffectual. To the confederated power of France and Spain, it was evident she could offer no effectual resistance; and Napoleon, without waiting for the result of her decision, directed an immediate seizure of all Portuguese vessels in the ports of France and Holland. Under these circumstances, notice was given to the English residents in Portugal of the precarious situation in which they stood; and they were warned, by a timely retreat, to escape from the rigorous measures to which, in the urgency of the crisis, it might be found necessary to have recourse.

In the meanwhile, preparations for the invasion of Portugal were proceeding without abatement or delay. An army of twenty-five thousand infantry, and three thousand cavalry, under the title of the Army of the Gironde, had assembled at Bayonne, and waited only for an order to advance. The government of Portugal was

at once intimidated and overawed; and the Prince Regent, anxious, by every possible concession, to dissipate the darkening cloud which appeared ready to burst in thunder over his devoted kingdom, was at length compelled to sacrifice principle to safety, and purchase, even the chance of impunity, by injustice. His acquiescence in the measures prescribed for his adoption was intimated to the Courts of France and Spain; the property and persons of all subjects of England were seized, and a proclamation was issued prohibiting all commercial intercourse between the countries.

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These extorted sacrifices of the Prince Regent, produced no favourable change in his own fortunes or those of Portugal. The dismemberment of the kingdom had already been determined, and the humiliating compliances of the government, tended rather to accelerate than retard the natural progress of events.

Such were the relations of France and the Peninsula, when the family differences which had long existed between Charles and the Prince of Asturias at length approached to an open rupture. The latter was hostile to Godoy, and naturally indignant at the disgraceful causes of his

CHAP I. favour. The party opposed to the minister, emboldened by the accession of so powerful an auxiliary, had been active in establishing intrigues for the overthrow of the favourite, while Ferdinand endeavoured to strengthen the cause which he espoused, by securing in its favour the influence of Beauharnois, the French ambassador at

1807.

Oct. 11. Madrid. Through the latter a secret communication from the Prince was transmitted to Napoleon, in which he solicited the honour of an alliance with the imperial family of France. He entreated also that Napoleon would interfere to regulate the internal disorders of the government, and conveyed assurances, that to him alone could Spain look for deliverance from the evils under which she had long been suffering.

To the solicitations of the Prince no answer was returned ; and Godoy having shortly afterwards become acquainted with the particulars of the transaction, Ferdinand, on the 28th of October, App. No. 5. was arrested at the Escorial, and confined in the monastery of St. Laurence. On the 30th, a proclamation appeared charging him with high treason, in having organized a conspiracy for the purpose of dethroning the King. In a letter addressed to Napoleon, written on the 29th,

Charles made an additional charge against his son, of contemplating the assassination of the Queen.

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The people, however, considered these accusations as originating solely in the machinations of Godoy; and this persuasion tended if possible still further to aggravate the hatred with which both his person and ministry were regarded by the nation. Godoy, alarmed at the tempestuous demonstrations of popular feeling, and aware of the evident perils which surrounded him, resolved, as usual, to retrace his steps, and become the instrument of reconciliation between the father and son. Ferdinand was accordingly induced to address a letter to the King, expressive of his contrition, and imputing the errors of his conduct to the influence and evil counsels of the Dukes del Infantado and San Carlos. This submission of the Prince produced the desired effect. Charles issued a second proclamation, extending pardon to his son, but stating that he had denounced the names of those principally concerned in the conspiracy, and directing a select commission of the council of Castile to assemble immediately for the trial of the offenders. By this tribunal the partisans of the Prince were acquitted of all

App. No. 6.

Nov. 5.

CHAP. I. treasonable intention ; but being professedly hostile to the administration of Godoy, through his influence they were severally banished from the capital, by the arbitrary edict of the Sovereign.

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Oct. 29. The letter which was addressed to Napoleon by the King, on the imprisonment of the Prince of Asturias, was not more fortunate than that of his son, in eliciting a reply. It conveyed expressions of surprise, on the part of Charles, that the Emperor had not thought proper to consult him, in a matter so deeply interesting as the projected marriage of the heir-apparent. The remonstrance of his ally appears to have been treated by Napoleon with contemptuous neglect; and the ominous silence of the French ruler, was regarded by Godoy as a symptom of alienation from his interests, the consequences of which he was not prepared to encounter. His apprehensions were still further excited by a communication from Murat, with whom he was on terms of confidential intercourse, informing him, that though the wishes of the Emperor prompted him to support his authority, yet the popularity of Ferdinand, and the near relation to himself in which that prince would be placed by the intend-

ed alliance with his family, rendered it impossible that he should take any prominent or open part in opposition to his interest or wishes.

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Godoy already felt that his power was in the wane. Without the support of Napoleon, he was too conscious of his own feebleness and unpopularity, not to be aware that he must soon fall before the covert intrigues and open assaults of his enemies. Anxious, therefore, to adopt whatever measures might tend to ingratiate him with his protector, he prevailed on Charles to address another letter to the Emperor, soliciting his consent to the alliance of the Prince of Asturias with a branch of his august family. Even this second communication produced no immediate reply; and leaving the Spanish Monarch and his minister in a state of painful solicitude, Napoleon set out for Italy.

While at Milan, he at length condescended to answer the King of Spain's letters. His communication contained assurances that he was entirely ignorant of the circumstances connected with the conspiracy of Ferdinand; and stated that his first intelligence of the transaction had been derived from the letter of the King. He denied likewise having received any proposal

Nov. 15.

CHAP. I. from the Prince for an alliance with his family,

1807. but expressed his sanction and approbation of the
contemplated arrangement.

Such is a rapid and imperfect sketch of some
of the more important events which preceded the
hostile invasion of the Peninsula.

CHAPTER II.

INVASION OF PORTUGAL.

THE humiliating compliances of the Portuguese Government produced no beneficial consequences on the fortunes of the nation. Early in November, the army of the Gironde, commanded by Marshal Junot, who had formerly been ambassador at Lisbon, received orders to cross the Pyrenees, and advance on Salamanca. While thus threatening the territory of Portugal, the French Commander, so far from accompanying his advance with any profession of hostility, proclaimed his sole object to be the emancipation of her government from the yoke of England, and to enable it to assume the attitude of an independent power. Disposed as the Prince Regent might be, to yield ready credence to such flattering assurances, the return of his ambas-

CHAP. II.

1807.

CHAP. II. **sadors**, who had been dismissed from Paris and

1807.

Madrid, could not but appear an alarming indication of the hostile purpose for which the armament had been assembled.

The arrival in the Tagus of a Russian squadron, consisting of nine sail of the line and two frigates, contributed still farther to heighten the embarrassment of the government. The appearance of this formidable force, at a juncture so critical, appears to have been a coincidence entirely accidental, and unconnected, in any manner, with the operations by which the integrity of Portugal was then so imminently threatened. But it carried with it at least the appearance of design, and was naturally regarded, both by England and Portugal, as forming part of the great scheme of events, by which Napoleon was endeavouring to realize the gigantic projects of his ambition.

The injuries which foreign coercion had compelled the Portuguese government to inflict on England, had not excited the hostility of that power. The British government saw too plainly the magnitude of the dangers by which Portugal was surrounded, to resent a policy which had been forced on her rulers by difficulties

with which it was impossible to contend. But there are certain limits to forbearance, which cannot be overpassed without sacrifice of honour; and it was distinctly intimated, that, although the exclusion of British vessels from the ports, and the expulsion of British subjects from the territory of Portugal, had not, under all the circumstances, been regarded as a hostile proceeding, any further act of aggression would be treated as a declaration of war, and give rise to immediate reprisals.

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In order to give greater authority to this representation, a squadron, commanded by Sir Sydney Smith, was sent to cruize off the Tagus; and, on the appearance of another proclamation, directing the seizure of the persons, and the confiscation of the property of all English residents in Portugal, Lord Strangford, the British Envoy, immediately quitted Lisbon, and retired on board the ship of the Admiral.

In such a state of things, the arrival of the Russian fleet could scarcely fail to add embarrassment and complexity to the difficulties by which the government of Portugal was environed. It was regarded by England as connected with the hostile proceedings of Napoleon; and

CHAP. II. Lisbon was immediately declared in a state of
 1807. rigorous blockade, and every effort was exerted to prevent all naval communication with the Tagus.

The army of the Gironde had already reached Alcantara, where, according to the stipulations of the convention, it was joined by the Spanish contingent. The sufferings of the troops, during the march from Salamanca, are described by the French officers to have been dreadful. The weather was stormy and inclement, and the roads, from the melting of the snow, rendered almost impassable. In proportion as the army advanced, its difficulties appeared to accumulate. The Spanish government was unprepared for the promptitude and rapidity of the march of the French army ; and no magazines had been formed for its supply. The want of provision introduced disorder into the ranks. The starving soldiers quitted their battalions, and roamed about the country in search of plunder ; and when the van of the army reached Alcantara, it was in a state of utter wretchedness and destitution.

From Alcantara, Marshal Junot issued a proclamation to the Portuguese nation, declaring, that his only object in entering their territory,

Nov. 17.

Thiebault,
p. 19.

was to emancipate the government from the yoke of England. It called on the people to receive their invaders as friends engaged in hostilities against one common enemy, and denounced the severest punishments on all who should take arms on his approach.

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App. No. 7.

On the 19th of November, the army passed the frontier, and moved onward to Lisbon by the route of Castello Branco. On the 23d, the vanguard reached Abrantes, and the government had found itself utterly unable to organize any effective system of defence. The rapid advance of the enemy had taken the Prince Regent by surprise. None of the fortresses of his kingdom had been garrisoned or provisioned, and no proclamation of the government had given notice to the people in what light their invaders were to be regarded. Deceived, till too late, by the hope that hostilities might still be averted by a submissive compliance with the dictates of the Emperor, all defensive precautions had been neglected. It was only when the French army were within four days' march of the capital, that the Prince Regent received intelligence of the treaty of Fontainebleau, and became at length aware of the full extent and bearing of his danger.

CHAP. II. While yet undecided as to the course most
1807. advisable amid the instant perils which surrounded him, a flag of truce entered the Tagus, and the Prince Regent received assurances from Lord Strangford, that, notwithstanding the demonstrations of hostility to which his government had been compelled to resort, the British Admiral would readily co-operate in any measures that might contribute to the security of the Royal Family. These assurances were relied on ; and, influenced by the counsels of the ambassador, he determined at once to quit the kingdom and embark for Brazil. No time was to be lost in carrying this resolution into effect. The enemy were already at the gates ; and having nominated a council of regency, the Prince Regent, accompanied by the Queen and the other members of his family, embarked amid the tears of the suffering people whom necessity had compelled him to abandon.

Nov. 27.

The French took possession of Lisbon without opposition. The suddenness of the events by which the independence of the country had been sacrificed, seems to have cast the nation into a stupor from which it required some time to emerge. Junot, a man neither harsh in dis-

position nor repulsive in manner, appears at first to have studied the arts of popularity, not without partial success. On his entry into the city he was ^{*}met by a deputation from the authorities, who presented an address congratulating him on his arrival, and soliciting his protection for the capital. Nothing, we are assured, could be more wretched than the appearance of the triumphant army by which the subjection of a kingdom had been thus rapidly achieved. Piquets of the Portuguese Royal Guard acted as guides to the French troops, and conducted them to their quarters. The imaginations of the people had been excited by the achievements of the heroes of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena, and they had expected to gaze on a race of beings superior in all noble and personal attributes to the rest of mankind. How then were they astonished to behold a long line of limping, emaciated, and ragged soldiers, enfeebled by incessant marching and privation, and devoid even of the ordinary appurtenances of military pomp, enter their city with lagging pace and in disorderly ranks! How rapidly the vision of glory must have vanished from their eyes!

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Foy,
v. ii. p. 401.

Juno^t at first endeavoured to conciliate the

CHAP. II. inhabitants by professions of friendly intention,
1807. and of a deep anxiety for the welfare and prosperity of the kingdom. The customary forms of government were observed in all his public decrees, and a politic respect was shewn to the prejudices and peculiar observances of the people. By such conduct, he succeeded in lulling for a time the more obtrusive demonstrations of innate hostility which pervaded the great mass of the population, and Lisbon remained for several weeks in a state of sullen though tranquil quiescence.

When Junot, however, had succeeded in reorganizing his army, broken down and enfeebled by the severity and privations of their hurried march; when he beheld the fortresses of the kingdom tenanted by French garrisons, the native population deprived of their arms, and many of those who by their talents and popularity were likely to incite resistance to his authority, despatched on a mission of compliment to Napoleon, he thought it no longer necessary to dissemble. He at once threw aside the mask under which he had hitherto disguised the tyrannical designs of his master, and publicly proclaimed that Portugal was no

longer to be considered an independent power, but a mere appanage of France. It was declared, that the house of Braganza had ceased to reign.

1808

By abandoning the country, it had forfeited all right to the allegiance of the people; and in the style of emphatic command peculiar to Napoleon, the nation were informed, that "the Emperor *willed* that Portugal should thereafter be governed in his name, by the General-in-chief of his army." By another exercise of imperial despotism the estates of the crown were confiscated, and heavy contributions imposed on the country at large. The reins of supreme authority were then publicly assumed by Junot, and the ancient insignia of the kingdom displaced by those of France.

App. No. 8.

Dated
Milan,
Dec. 23.

The cause of the invaders, contaminated as it was by acts of barbarous oppression, found many partisans among the aristocracy of the country, and even among the clergy. The Patriarch of Lisbon issued a pastoral letter to his flock, begging them, in the name of *patriotism* and *religion*, to unite in establishing the authority of the intrusive government, and in bringing those to punishment who should dare to disturb the tranquillity of the country by vain and contumacious resist-

App. No. 9.
Dec. 8.

CHAP. II. ance. But it is unquestionable that the burden
1808. of foreign thralldom carried with it, an outrage
on all the better and prouder feelings of the
people. Unaccustomed to any yoke, save that
of a native and domestic despot, they burned
with desire to burst the galling shackles by which
they had been suddenly enthralled, and to wreak
their vengeance on the authors of the national
misfortunes and degradation.

Yet the demonstrations of these feelings were
not in proportion to their depth and ardour. Oc-
casionally a tumult in the streets of Lisbon, and
curses, not loud but deep, muttered on the French
soldiery, as they passed on in the pomp and pa-
nopoly of war, gave evidence how little amalga-
mation of feeling the government had been suc-
cessful in inducing between the conquerors and
the conquered—the oppressors and the oppressed.
When insurrection stalked forth into open day,
it was instantly punished and suppressed by a
vigilant police, and the strong arm of military
power : but for that alienation of heart, that
deep-rooted though silent hatred of their invad-
ers, which rankled in the bosoms of the people,
a cure was not to be found by those who violat-
ed their prejudices, and outraged their religion.

It was in vain, therefore, that Junot endeavoured to captivate the nation, by dazzling pictures of the prosperity which was about to dawn on the oppressed and suffering country. It was in vain that he promised roads, canals, commerce, an improved government, and the wide diffusion of intelligence. To the value of such blessings the people were insensible. The shadowy glories of this visionary perspective were gazed on with indifference or incredulity. All their wants and aspirations were concentrated in one single word—*Freedom*. Not indeed freedom in its wider and more valuable acceptation ; but freedom from the tyrannical yoke of foreign dominion ; freedom again to become the slaves of a government, adapted, by its own limited intelligence, to the prejudices of the nation over which it ruled.

One of the first steps which the policy of Junot led him to adopt, in order to secure the peaceable occupation of the country, was that of disbanding a large portion of the native army, and employing the remainder in foreign service. Accordingly, the thirty-seven regiments which constituted the standing force of the kingdom, were reduced to seven regiments of infantry and three of cavalry, and of these a large proportion

CHAP. II. was immediately organized, and sent off to France,
1808. under the command of the Marquis de Alorna. The superior officers of this corps were selected from the number of those who possessed the highest character and influence among their countrymen. They were proud, we are assured, of serving under the banners of Napoleon, of enjoying an opportunity of sharing those laurels which had hitherto been so plentifully gathered by his victorious soldiers. But such feelings did not extend to the great body of the army. To them, the path of military distinction appeared less strewn with flowers than thorns. Animated, perhaps, with feelings of deeper patriotism than those who led them to the field, they felt also more deeply the pang of separation from their country, and saw, with a clearer view, the difficulties, the dangers, and the privations, to which, in their destined service, they could not fail to be exposed.*

* Of the aversion of the Portuguese to embark in the service of France, the following striking facts, narrated by General Foy, afford sufficient proof. When the army of Alorna began its march, it was between eight and nine thousand strong. In passing through Spain, more than four thousand deserted and returned home. Five or six hundred remained in the hospitals. Some

In the invasion of Portugal the Spanish troops appear to have played altogether an insignificant part. Their leaders were allowed to assume no command over the provinces which had been allotted them by treaty, and the authority of Junot was that by which alone all public acts were promulgated or enforced. Even this circumstance brought with it some alleviation to the fears of the nation. The terms of the treaty of Fontainebleau had filled the people with despair. The dismemberment of their country, was the misfortune of all others which they regarded with the deepest dismay. The assumption, therefore, of the supreme authority by Junot, abhorrent as in other respects it might be to their feelings, carried with it the belief that the stipulations which decreed the separation and dismemberment of Portugal were no longer intended to be enforced. If the future presented but a choice of evils, it seemed at least the smaller and less formidable, to become the dependent of France, than to be cut up and

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were killed at the first siege of Saragossa; and, out of the whole number, only three thousand two hundred and forty arrived at Bayonne.

CHAP. II. parcelled out into sovereignties, too limited in
 1808. extent, resources, and population, to afford the means of effective repulsion to foreign insult or aggression.

Another circumstance contributed to confirm and to augment the hopes of the people, that the integrity of the country at least, would be saved from violation. The deputation from Lisbon which had been sent to congratulate the Emperor, were received by that monarch with a degree of flattering condescension, which led them to augur too favourably of his intentions towards Portugal. In consequence of this interview the
 April 27. deputies addressed a letter to their countrymen, which was made public in Lisbon. It was signed by the Bishop of Coimbra, by the Marquis of Abrantes, president of the council of regency, nominated by the Prince on his departure, and by Don Nuno Caetano de Mello, connected by blood with the reigning family, and by many others of powerful influence in the state.

App. No. 10. In this document the nation were assured, that the mighty genius of Napoleon could be equalled only by the elevation of his soul, and the disinterested generosity of his principles; that the army of France had entered Por-

tugal not as conquerors but friends ; that in occupying the kingdom, Napoleon had not been influenced by enmity to their former Sovereign, but by the wish to enable the nation to cast off the trammels of England, and unite itself with the great continental system established over Europe. The deputies further stated, that the Emperor knew and lamented the privations which Portugal, in common with other nations, had endured from the temporary suspension of her commerce, and conveyed the Imperial assurance, that these would speedily be succeeded by great and lasting prosperity. The nation, they affirmed, stood absolved from all allegiance to the house of Braganza, which had forsaken them in the time of danger and difficulty ; and they assured the people, that the only course by which the honour and integrity of the country could be secured, was that of unlimited submission to their great and magnanimous deliverer.

This address of the deputies was not without its influence on the people. The hope of the restoration of their ancient dynasty, for a time had died in their hearts. Their sovereign was already in another hemisphere ; and the course of events seemed to hold out no prospect

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CHAP. II. of his future restoration. In such circumstances,

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it is scarcely possible to doubt, that, had the government of France been moderated in its action on the nation by the dictates of humanity and prudence, the prejudices of the people would have gradually yielded, and their attachment to the fugitive sovereign have progressively diminished. To such a consummation, however, the abuses and oppression of the new government certainly did not tend. Contributions of unexampled magnitude were levied on the people; and the severity of the measures by which these inordinate exactions were enforced, brought home at once to the bosoms of the people, a deep consciousness of the rapacity of their rulers. They beheld the plate torn by sacrilegious hands from their churches; the palaces of their nobles plundered; while even the humble dwellings of the poor were robbed of the little hoard that industry had enabled them to amass.

Was it possible that a government which sanctioned such detestable proceedings could ever acquire a footing in the affections of the nation? Or, was it possible by any measures of insult and outrage, to rouse into more

vehement resistance, the whole passions of a people? Human action is the offspring more frequently of impulse than of reason. A nation may be subdued, but it can seldom be trampled on with impunity. Notwithstanding the hopelessness of resistance, the spirit of national animosity was continually breaking forth in acts of isolated rebellion against the power of their oppressors.

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CHAPTER III.

INVASION OF SPAIN.

CHAP. III. WHILE Portugal had thus become the prey of
1807. the spoiler, a deeper and more hazardous game was playing by Napoleon in Spain. The sluices of war had now been opened ; and the French armies swept onward into the Peninsula, like a mighty torrent, covering and overwhelming the land.

It was stipulated, by the Treaty of Fontainebleau, that, exclusive of the force destined more immediately for the reduction of Portugal, a *corps de reserve*, of forty thousand men, should be assembled at Bayonne, ready to repel any hostile demonstration of England for the relief of her ally. The army of the Gironde, therefore,

had no sooner crossed the Pyrenees, than another corps, of twenty-four thousand of the anticipated conscriptions of 1808, was assembled on the frontier. The commander of this force was General Dupont, an officer who was destined, in Spain, to blight the laurels which, under a happier star, he had acquired in other fields. Arrangements were speedily made for the advance of this second army of the Gironde; and, having crossed the frontier, its march was directed on Valladolid, in which city the head-quarters of General Dupont were established. The situation was in all respects happily chosen. Valladolid is a position which commands the roads both to Lisbon and Madrid, and thus, without any unequivocal demonstration of his views, Dupont was prepared to advance on either capital as circumstances might require.

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But the warlike preparations of France had not yet attained their full development. A third army, consisting of twenty-five thousand Infantry, three thousand cavalry, and forty-one pieces of artillery, was assembled on the Garonne. On the 9th of January, the vanguard of this force, commanded by Marshal Moncey, crossed the Bidassoa, and pushed onward into Spain, over-

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CHAP. III. running Biscay and Navarre in its advance.

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January.

Even this was not all. Another force was collected at the eastern extremity of the Pyrenean chain, consisting of twelve thousand men of different arms, intended for the occupation of Catalonia. Independently of all other circumstances, the congregation of this force should at once have opened the eyes of Charles and his minister to the hostile schemes of Napoleon. All resistance in Portugal to the usurpation of France was already at an end, yet the reinforcement of the armament in that kingdom, formed the only pretence on which the introduction of large and successive armies into the western provinces of Spain, was attempted to be justified. The views of the French ruler in thus assembling an army on the north-eastern frontier of the kingdom, admitted, however, of no such colouring or excuse. It carried with it an indication of hostile intention, too palpable to admit of fallacious interpretation. But all measures of spirit and vigour seem to have been alien to the character of Charles and his minister. No energetic steps were taken to repress the invaders ; no call was made to rouse the loyalty and patriotism of the people ; and the des-

plicable rulers of this unhappy country were contented to behold the progress of insult and aggression, in silence and submission. So blunted and obtuse were the perceptions of the government of Spain, that it could neither appreciate nor understand the moral energy of the people whom it governed, when roused into powerful and consentaneous resistance.

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Though the character of Napoleon's views on the Peninsula had, in a great measure, been denuded of disguise, it is probable that, even at this period, they were apprehended by none, in their full bearing and extent. The independence of Spain indeed, thanks to the fatuity of her rulers, was gone. The yoke was on her shoulders, and the iron bit of the oppressor in her mouth. But none could calculate the erratic course of an ambition, which was continually subject to the operation of a thousand unknown influences. The measures, however, by which the projects of the French Emperor were to be carried into effect, had become no longer secret. On the great roads from France nothing was to be seen but convoys of ammunition and provisions, trains of artillery, the marching of battalions, and officers riding post in the execution of military duty.

Foy, ii. 123.

CHAP. III. From the Bidassoa to the Douro the country was
1808. covered with soldiers. The convents were con-
February. verted into hospitals and barracks, forts and bat-
teries were erected on the more commanding
stations, and in all the principal towns even the
functions of the civil magistrate were assumed
by the intruders.

The character of the troops thus profusely
poured into the Peninsula, is represented, by
competent authority, to have been of the worst
description. The officers were either veterans, dis-
qualified by age and infirmities for the arduous
duties thus involuntarily imposed on them, or ig-
norant boys, prematurely taken from school, to
be intrusted with the discharge of functions to
which from youth and inexperience they were
inadequate. The soldiery was composed of men
of all countries, returned deserters, and recruits
from the hospitals. It was impossible that
masses composed of elements so dissimilar, should
be inspired with any corporate spirit, or senti-
ment of collective honour. Disunited by diver-
sity of language, prejudice, and education, the sol-
diers of an army, thus thrown fortuitously to-
gether, could be animated by no common remem-
brances of former achievements, nor participate

in the feeling of confidence and brotherhood which emanates from the anticipated fellowship of future glory. Strangers to each other ; unconnected by community of interest ; united by no bond but that of military command ; unknown to their officers, by whom their comfort was neglected ; irregularly provisioned, and still more irregularly paid ; these were apparently not the men from whom any great or brilliant achievement could be rationally expected.

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On the return of Napoleon from Italy, orders were instantly issued for summoning into service a new conscription of eighty thousand men. These were speedily assembled, and Murat having been appointed to the command, they pushed forward into Spain, and remained concentrated in the neighbourhood of Vittoria, ready, on the earliest signal, to advance on Madrid.

March

It would, perhaps, be little interesting—it would, at all events, be incompatible with the narrow limits of the present work—to enter on a detailed and minute account of the measures of disguised hostility and open fraud, by which, at this period, the projects of the French ruler made rapid advances to completion. It is suffi-

CHAP. III. cient to state, that the important fortresses of
1808. St. Sebastian, Pampluna, Figueras, and Barce-
March. lona, fell, without resistance, into the posses-
sion of the invaders, whose force in the north-
ern provinces continued almost hourly to in-
crease.

The time, however, had not yet come when Napoleon considered it prudent to throw off the mask under which his designs were veiled from the Spanish monarch. He flattered the vanity of Charles, by sending him magnificent tokens of regard, and in his letters continued to express his ardent desire for the completion of the contemplated alliance of their families. Napoleon further stated his intention of visiting the Spanish capital, where, without the intervention of diplomatic forms, all matters of difference between them might be personally arranged.

The promised visit, however, did not take place; but Izquierdo, the confidential agent of Godoy at the court of Paris, was despatched on a mission to Madrid, bearing the proposals of the Emperor to the King of Spain. These were of a character undoubtedly somewhat startling and exorbitant. Assuming his own pretensions to the

sovereignty of Portugal, to be at once exclusive and undisputed, Napoleon demanded in exchange for that country the kingdoms of Galicia, Biscay, and Navarre, in order to prevent the necessity of maintaining a military communication through the territory of Spain. It was proposed, likewise, that France should participate in the commerce of the Spanish colonies on the same terms as the mother country; and it was signified to Charles, that the time had at length arrived when it was necessary that the succession to the Spanish throne should become the subject of a final and immediate settlement. Such were the terms on which it was intimated to the King of Spain, he could alone hope to avoid the dreaded hostility of Napoleon.

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Of the events in Portugal, Godoy had been no uninterested spectator. He saw that his star, which had long been declining, was at length fast approaching the aphelion. In weariness of heart, he would gladly have resigned that power, whose possession had been to him one long scene, not of enjoyment but of struggle. To the principality which had been assigned him by the Treaty of Fontainebleau, as affording the only chance of honourable retirement, he still looked

CHAP. III. forward with fondly cherished anticipations. But

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time passed on without bringing with it the expected gratification ; and at length the public declaration that the undivided sovereignty of Portugal had been assumed by Napoleon, put an end for ever to his hopes.

Under the deepest cloud of his misfortunes, it is impossible to compassionate Godoy. The whole efforts of his public life had been directed towards the single object, of promoting his own personal enjoyment. Never was a more ignoble purpose more perseveringly pursued, and never was there a failure more signal and complete. Disappointed in all his endeavours to secure the permanent enjoyment of his wealth and honours, his hopes were at length narrowed to passing the remainder of his life in some obscure and tranquil retreat. He already meditated the resignation of his public offices, and was restrained only by the consciousness, that by the loss of power he would be deprived of his only safeguard from the violence of an indignant people.

Amid the wreck of his hopes in the Old World, the views of Godoy were naturally directed to the New ; and still anxious to escape the perils by which he saw himself environed, he proposed to

Charles to consult the tranquillity of his declining years by transferring the seat of sovereignty to his transatlantic dominions. Charles, exhausted by infirmity, and hopeless of relief from the assistance of Napoleon, acceded to the advice of his minister, and, with all possible secrecy, preparations were set on foot for the departure of the Court. The army of Solano was recalled from Portugal, and directed to march for Seville. Troops were stationed along the road by which the royal travellers were to pass, and the body guards were ordered to march from Madrid to Aranjuez.

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These preparatory movements, however, did not pass unnoticed by the people, whose fears were strongly excited by the prospect of the departure of their sovereign. Their discontent became clamorous and obtrusive; and a proclamation of the King, in which he denied being influenced by any intention of quitting the kingdom, had not the effect of restoring public confidence and tranquillity.

The indignation of the populace was still further excited, by the circulation of reports, that, notwithstanding the assurances contained in the royal proclamation, preparations were still in

CHAP. III. progress for the evasion of the Monarch. Among
 1808. those who gave currency to such intelligence was
 March. the Prince of Asturias. Relying on the protec-
 tion of Napoleon, whom he considered favourable
 to his views, Ferdinand had openly declared his
 aversion to the project of emigration, and this
 coincidence with the national feeling, had the ef-
 fect of still further increasing his popularity.

Time brought new confirmation to the suspicions
 of the people, and the demonstrations of public
 discontent became daily more violent and tumult-
 Mar. 17. tuous. On the 17th of March, Aranjuez was
 surrounded by a multitude of peasants from the
 neighbouring villages, in a state of violent ex-
 citation. In the palace they found every symp-
 tom of preparation for a journey; and goaded
 almost to frenzy by this proof of royal duplicity,
 they seized arms and shouted for vengeance on
 Godoy. The Life-Guards were drawn out for the
 defence of the palace, and the people rushed in
 tumultuous confusion to the house of the favour-
 ite. The servants of the Infant Don Antonio
 and the Count de Montijo were the first to raise
 the cry of "*Death to Godoy! The King for
 ever!*" In a moment it was simultaneously re-
 verberated by many thousand voices. A squa-

dron of the Prince's Guard advanced to protect their leader ; and in the execution of this duty were furiously assaulted by the mob. The brother of the favourite, Don Diego de Godoy, then came up with his regiment of guards, and directed them to fire on the multitude. The troops refused to obey ; and uniting with the populace, struck and insulted their colonel and joined in the onset. The doors of the house were burst open, the furniture broken to pieces, and the splendid contents of the mansion subjected to unsparing havoc. In the meanwhile, Godoy had escaped ; the Princess de la Paz, terrified and trembling, ran out into the street ; yet so little was that injured lady the object of popular aversion, that she was escorted to the palace with every demonstration of respect.

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This alarming exhibition of national feeling produced the desired effect. Godoy was instantly removed from his offices of Generalissimo and High Admiral ; and Charles declared his resolution of assuming personally the command of his forces, both naval and military. At Madrid events of a similar character took place. Intelligence of what was passing at Aranjuez, had no sooner reached the capital, than the cry of

Mar. 18.

CHAP. III. "*Death to Godoy*" was echoed through all the streets and squares of the city. Crowds assembled round the houses of the Prince of Peace, his mother, his brother, and his sister. They were attacked and plundered, the furniture was thrown into the streets and burned, and all their inmates subjected to insult and abuse. The greater part of the garrison had been withdrawn to Aranjuez; and the few remaining troops were found altogether insufficient to preserve order. The riot continued for two days, during which no restraint was attempted to be imposed on the violence of the people. Tranquillity was at length only restored by the proclamation of the King declaring the deposition of Godoy.

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Notwithstanding the deposition of the favourite, the appetite of the people for vengeance was yet unsated. The simple privation of that power which he had so flagrantly abused, appeared, in their ideas of retributive justice, to be a punishment altogether inadequate to his deserts. Nothing less than the gibbet or the block would satisfy the excited craving of the populace, who thirsted for his blood. The escape of Godoy was no sooner known, than pursuit was made after him in every direction. On the

morning of the 19th he was found concealed in a garret at Ocana, where he had remained without food for nearly two days. The populace dragged him from his hiding-place ; and he would inevitably have fallen a victim to their fury, had not the Prince of Asturias, with a body of Life-Guards appeared to his rescue. The popularity of Ferdinand saved the life of Godoy ; and the multitude, on receiving the promise of the Prince, that the object of their hostility should be given up to justice, quietly dispersed.

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The support of Charles was at last broken. Godoy, in spite of the favour of the monarch, was in the power of his enemies ; and Charles, in his declining years, at length knew himself to be friendless and alone. Suffering from the united inroads of age and infirmity, he felt

- That like a column left alone,
The tottering remnant of some splendid fane,
'Scaped from the fury of the barbarous Gaul,
And wasting time, which has the rest o'erthrown,
Amidst his house's ruins, he remained
Single, unpropped, and nodding to his fall.

In the person of Godoy, the real, though vicarious sovereign, had already been dethroned,

CHAP. III. and the crown at once fell from the brows of the
 1808. shadow which had hitherto worn the semblance
 March. of a monarch. On the evening of the day following, Charles notified, in a public decree, his abdication of the throne. "The habitual infirmities," he said, "under which he had long laboured, rendered him incapable of supporting the heavy burden of government ; the enjoyment of private life, and a climate more temperate than that of Spain, had become necessary for the restoration of his health ; and, in these circumstances, he had resolved on abdicating the crown in favour of his beloved son. He, therefore, by this decree of free and spontaneous abdication, made known his royal will, that the Prince of Asturias should forthwith be acknowledged and obeyed as king and natural lord of all his kingdoms and dominions."

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The joy of the nation on the abdication of their monarch was extreme. Charles had long ceased to be popular, and participated largely in the odium attached to his minister. Ferdinand was the idol of the nation ; and to him alone did the people look with passionate ardour of expectation for deliverance from all their perils and oppressions. Never, in times of danger and of trou-

ble, did a monarch mount the throne under loftier auspices. He carried with him the affections and devotion, of a proud and generous people. The seeds of resistance to foreign tyranny had been planted in the bosom of the nation, and were ready, at a breath, to have risen into a glorious harvest of armed men, prepared to sanctify the soil that bore them, by the outpouring of patriot blood. Never was the sacred cause of liberty and justice, more deeply injured and contaminated, by the folly and apostacy of its champion.

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The Council of Castile is the only body in Spain which bears even the semblance of a constitutional assembly. The princes and nobles of whom, in former ages, it was composed, held their seats by hereditary tenure, and acted in a capacity somewhat similar to that of privy council to the king. In later times, it was constituted a judicial body; and, since the disuse of the Cortes, had succeeded to many of the functions of that national assembly, while the prerogative of nominating or displacing the members at his pleasure, had been assumed by the monarch. Notwithstanding this dependance on royal favour, the Council of Castile, in character of conservator

CHAP. III. of the laws of the monarchy, resolved, with becoming dignity, to withhold their sanction from the abdication of the King, until the highest legal authority should have pronounced it valid, and consonant to constitutional usage. The new sovereign, however, was little disposed to give time for any laborious investigation of his title ; and issued an ordinance, enjoining the Council, without delay, to publish the abdication of Charles. The vicinity of the French army to the capital, and the danger and unpopularity of the duty they had assumed, induced them to comply with this peremptory mandate ; and the abdication of the late monarch was publicly notified

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Mar. 21. by the Council of Castile, unprecedented by the constitutional formalities.

The first edict of the Crown tended still farther to increase the popularity of Ferdinand. It contained an order both for the confiscation of the property of Godoy, and the privation of his honours ; and directed that, along with his brother, and the chief instruments of his malversations, he should be brought to immediate trial. The publication of this decree was the signal of public triumph and rejoicing. *Te Deum* was sung in the churches ; and in almost every village in the

kingdom, effigies of the favourite were burned, or trampled under foot by the populace. At Salamanca, the professors and scholars of the university gave scholastic demonstration of their joy on the downfall of the favourite, by dancing round bonfires in the market-place; and even the magnificent Botanic Garden, of which Godoy had been the founder and the patron, containing perhaps the finest collection of Exotics in Europe, was destroyed by the blind impulse of popular fury.

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After his accession, Ferdinand lost no time in promoting to office and honour, all those who had suffered in his cause in the affair of the Escorial. The Duke del Infantado was appointed commander of the Spanish Guards, and Governor of Castile. Don Miguel de Azanza was made Minister of Finance, and Don Gonzalo de O'Farrel, Minister of War. Of all the counsellors of the late king, Cevallos and the Marquis Caballero alone retained their situations, and continued to enjoy the favour of the Court. The former, from motives of delicacy, arising from family connexions with the late minister, tendered his resignation to the king. This was not accepted; and Ferdinand, in a public decree,

CHAP. III. vindicated Cevallos from the suspicion of participation in the evil projects of Godoy.

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Mar. 20.

Such were the domestic arrangements of the new monarch ; with regard to the character of his foreign policy, the world were not long left in doubt. Immediately on the abdication of his father, Ferdinand had addressed a letter to the French Emperor, in which the notification of his accession to the crown was accompanied by a declaration, that the recent changes at Madrid would, in no degree, affect the political relations of his government with France ; and this assurance was accompanied by an expression of his desire, to draw still closer the bonds of amity by which the two nations had been so long united. In the same communication, Ferdinand repeated his request, that the personal alliance with the family of the Emperor, of which he had long been ambitious, should be happily accomplished.

The chief command of the French armies in the Peninsula had been assumed by Murat. He was already approaching Madrid, when intelligence reached him of the commotions at Aranjuez. It is probable that both Napoleon and his commander had calculated on the departure of

the Spanish Monarch before the arrival of the army at the capital. The successful resistance of the people to this measure had not been foreseen ; and it occasioned a considerable derangement of their schemes. It is certain that the subjugation of Spain could not have been more effectually promoted, than by the emigration of the reigning family to America. Disappointed, however, in the result thus confidently anticipated, Murat continued his advance, in order to take advantage of any political disturbances which might be made conducive to the interests of his master. On the 23d he entered the capital, of which military possession was immediately taken by the troops under his command. This startling event was accompanied by assurances on the part of Murat, that the stay of his army would be of very limited duration, and that whenever public tranquillity should be restored at Madrid, it was his intention to continue his march towards Cadiz.

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Mar. 23.

On the following morning Ferdinand made his public entry into the capital, where he was greeted with tumultuous welcome, and received the homage of the nobility and great functionaries of the state. Of all the foreign Ambassa-

Mar. 24.

CHAP. III. dors, the French alone declined joining in any
1808. public demonstration of respect towards the new
March. monarch, or in acknowledging his title to the
Crown. The same line of conduct was adopted
by Murat, and justified to the Spanish ministers
by an equivocal explanation of its motives. He
declared himself solely influenced by a desire to
heal the divisions of the council; but likewise
stated the propriety of awaiting the decision of
the Emperor, before committing his government
by any step which might imply an acknowledg-
ment of the right of Ferdinand to the Crown.

The letter of the new monarch to Napoleon
was not the only communication from the parties,
regarding the recent changes at Madrid. Charles
Mar. 20. likewise transmitted immediate intelligence to
the Emperor of his abdication. In his letter he
solicited a continuance of that protection which
he had hitherto enjoyed, and expressed, like
Ferdinand, his fervent hope, that the intimate
alliance between the countries would continue
firm and unbroken. Of the claim for protection
thus doubly urged, Napoleon did not fail, to
take advantage. By the application of both par-
ties, a right was apparently given to an inter-
ference in the internal government of Spain,

too favourable to his views not to be exerted to the utmost. The functionaries of France, in executing the designs of their master, assumed the tone, not of counsellors, but rulers, and exercised a paramount influence in everything connected with the internal policy of Spain. The yoke of Napoleon was not easy, nor his burden light. Yet the government of Ferdinand was too unstable, and even the tenure by which he held the sceptre too precarious, to admit of his adopting any vigorous measures of resistance to the imperious dictation of a monarch, whose armies already girded his palace, and held possession of his capital. .

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A bolder monarch might have pursued a bolder policy. One more generous would have placed greater reliance, on the courage and devoted loyalty of his people. In the dictates of his own proud and daring spirit, in his own indignant impatience of foreign tyranny and dominion, he would have learned that the chivalrous energy of the Spanish character, though it had long slumbered, was not dead ; that the voice of their monarch might yet rouse it into grand and irresistible action. A gallant people waited but for the signal to burst, by a

CHAP. III. mighty and unanimous effort, the chains of the
1808. oppressor. That signal was not given. It was
March. not in the nature of their sovereign, either to
appreciate the dictates of true wisdom, or to
be influenced in his actions by generous and
lofty impulses. The nation had not profited
by their change of ruler. In power or eleva-
tion of intellect, Ferdinand was not superior to
his father ; and he possessed none of that bene-
volence which tended, in some measure, to re-
deem the weakness and the vices of Charles.
Like Charles he was devoid of moral courage ;
but he was even more obtuse in his moral sym-
pathies, more selfish, sensual, and not less ignor-
ant. He bore the heart of a slave in the bosom
of a monarch.

While the French were in the capital, the
Spanish government made no endeavours to
resist the progressive encroachments which were
gradually circumscribing both its power and inde-
pendence. No effort was made by a concentration
of military force to counteract their increasing
ascendency in the capital. The division of Sola-
no, which by its presence might have given con-
fidence to the people, and have operated as a
check on the measures of Murat, was ordered to

Badajos, and placed at the disposal of Junot. CHAP.III.
 The Spanish garrison in Madrid was trifling,
 when compared with the numerous army of
 the intruders, stationed in and around the city.
 The military force of Spain was dispersed
 in isolated divisions through the distant pro-
 vinces, or cut up into petty garrisons, which
 could scarcely be made available to any imme-
 diate necessity of the government.

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It was not therefore from the rulers of Spain, it was not from an undisciplined and scattered army, devoid of munition, and officered by men ignorant of war in all its practical details, that any formidable opposition to his projects was anticipated by Murat. His fears were alone excited by *the people*. The occurrences at Aranjuez and Madrid, the enthusiastic devotion manifested by the whole nation to their new sovereign, could not but engender the conviction, that from a people thus powerfully actuated by one common sentiment of loyalty, he had yet to calculate on a fierce, strenuous, and protracted resistance to any scheme of foreign usurpation. He read in the proud independence of the national spirit, that the day of struggle was fast approaching. The horizon of Spain had been overcast, but the

CHAP. III. stillness which pervaded her atmosphere, was yet
1808. unbroken. Murat was not deceived by this.
March. In the unnatural hush of the elements, he beheld
only an indication of the coming storm.

To intimidate the people, therefore, had now become the chief object of his policy. With this view measures were immediately taken for strengthening the position of the French army at Madrid. A large corps of infantry, with a numerous artillery, was posted on the height of Casa del Campo, in the immediate vicinity of the Royal Palace, which it commanded. Cannon were planted on all the eminences in the neighbourhood. New divisions were ordered instantly to direct their march on Madrid ; and the troops were publicly reviewed, in order, by a formidable demonstration of military power, to impress the people with a conviction of the hopelessness of resistance. The command of the capital was then assumed by the intruders. By order of Murat, General Grouchy was appointed Governor, and the municipal regulations by which Madrid had hitherto been governed, were superseded by military law.

Intelligence of the occurrences at the Spanish capital no sooner reached Napoleon, than he set

out for Bayonne, in order to be nearer the scene of action, and to maintain a more rapid communication with his armies. His final purpose of deposing the dynasty of the Bourbons had at length been adopted. Till now, it had probably been his intention that Ferdinand, united to his family by marriage, should have filled the throne of Spain. The Emperor well knew his intellectual weakness, his utter destitution of high and honourable principle, his timidity, and that ductile subserviency of character which adapted him for the servile instrument of a more powerful intelligence. Where could he have found a fitter or more submissive agent of vicarious tyranny than this? Why then, to dethrone a man so happily suited to his purposes, did Napoleon commit an act of perfidy incomparably greater than any by which his character had been stained, and which he could not be unconscious would be regarded throughout Europe with indignation?

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To this question the answer is not difficult. It appeared necessary to Napoleon, in order to secure the subserviency of Ferdinand, that he should be dependent on his power. Had the new monarch, like his father, been an object of indifference to the nation, nay, had his assump-

CHAP. III. tion of the crown been generally unpopular, he
 1808. might have found support in the armies of
 March. France. In such circumstances, it is probable,
 Napoleon would have seated him on the throne,
 and have stood forward as the champion of his
 right. It formed part of his policy that the Span-
 ish nation should continue, as in the time of
 Charles, to be divided by parties, so nearly bal-
 anced, that the influence of France, when thrown
 into the scale, could give to either a decided
 preponderance. When he saw, therefore, that
 Ferdinand, weak and unworthy as he was, had
 become the object of a loyalty and devotion so
 deep and ardent, and already occupied a throne
 to which he had been raised by an influence
 altogether independent of his power, the views
 and policy of Napoleon were at once changed.
 The king who, by a single word, could rouse
 a nation into arms, who carried with him the
 full and undivided sympathies of a generous
 and brave people, was not the man by whom it
 suited his purposes that Spain should be govern-
 ed. Contemptible as he might be, in all personal
 attributes, there was danger in the vicinity of
 such a neighbour. In the affections of the peo-
 ple, he possessed a mighty lever, by which Na-

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oleon was aware that the schemes of his ambition might at any time be overthrown. He knew it to be impossible that a sovereign, backed by an influence so powerful, could become the tame dependent on his will. Even the obedience of such a monarch would bear the character rather of voluntary compliance than of humble and enforced submission. This was not a state of things which the policy of Napoleon was directed to establish. It was indispensable to his purposes that the crown should be torn from the brows of a prince who reigned in the affections of his people; and the imperial fiat, which decreed the deposition of the Bourbons, was at length sent irrevocably forth.

It is difficult to believe that the sudden demission of the crown by Charles was altogether an independent and voluntary act. Connected with the preceding events, it certainly bore evidence of haste and compulsion. The act of abdication was unaccompanied by any future provision for the King and Queen, the place of the royal residence was not determined, and none of the stipulations, by which it is probable that such a document would be preceded, appear to have been proposed by the retiring monarch.

CHAP. III. Napoleon was not slow in taking full advantage of these suspicious circumstances. Murat was no sooner apprized of the intentions of his master than he despatched a messenger to Aranjuez, with assurances to Charles, that his cause would be supported by the arms of France. Naturally actuated by a deep sense of filial injustice, the deposed monarch instantly expressed his readiness to avail himself of the offers thus conveyed. He assured General Monthion that the revolution had been the consequence of a conspiracy; and vehemently complained that his son, in spite of his entreaty, was about to banish him to Badajoz, the most unhealthy situation in the kingdom. The Queen, it was further stated, had entreated permission that their departure might, for a short time at least, be deferred, but this likewise had been refused. There is something pitiable in the bitter and helpless complaints of the aged Sovereign; and it is well they should be recorded, from the light they throw on the causes of that relentless hatred, by which Charles and the Queen appear to have been actuated towards Ferdinand, in the subsequent transactions at Bayonne.

The exile of the dethroned monarch was averted

by the intervention of Murat. Emboldened by this act of favour, Charles placed in the hands of the French General, a formal protest, declaring, that the Deed of Abdication was invalid and compulsory. He likewise transmitted a letter to the Emperor, containing a statement of the facts connected with his resignation of the crown, and professing that he relied on the justice and magnanimity of Napoleon, to re-establish him in his rights.

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There was another object, however, on which the desires, both of Charles and the Queen, were even more deeply fixed than on the restoration of the Crown. From the time of the tumult at Aranjuez, the danger of Godoy seems to have haunted their imaginations like a frightful dream. They now besought Murat, with importunate solicitations, to exert his influence in behalf of this unworthy object. His only crime, they said, had been his attachment to his sovereign; and Charles, in the fulness of his heart, declared, that the death of Godoy would be but the harbinger of his own,—he could not survive him.

The intercourse thus carried on between Charles and Murat, was kept profoundly secret

CHAP. III. from the government of Ferdinand. The agents

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of Napoleon had hitherto refrained from any acknowledgment of the new monarch. It was their policy to impress Ferdinand with a feeling of insecurity, and to induce him, by humiliating submissions, to court the favour and protection of France. A report was accordingly spread, that Napoleon had quitted Paris, and was already on his route to Madrid. It was notified to the French army, that the Emperor in person was about to become their leader. Ferdinand was likewise informed, that it would probably be considered by Napoleon, as an acceptable mark of respect, should the Infante, Don Carlos, be deputed to receive him on the frontier. The suggestion was immediately adopted, and the Infante, accompanied by the Duke del Infantado, set forward on the complimentary mission.

The policy of Murat was not limited to the attainment of this partial success. A still more delicate proposal was made to the Monarch. It was hinted, that if Ferdinand in person would advance from his capital for the purpose of welcoming the Emperor, a mark of consideration so distinguished could scarcely fail to influence the sentiments of Napoleon powerfully in his favour. The

suggestion of Murat was seconded by all the influence of Beauharnois, the Ambassador of France ; and the King was yet wavering in his resolution, when General Savary arrived in Madrid, and declared himself the bearer of a message from the Emperor.

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In his first audience of the King, the nature and extent of his mission were explained to Ferdinand. He had been deputed, he said, to convey the compliments of his master, and to express his desire to be informed whether the sentiments of Ferdinand towards France were similar to those of his father. Should his answer on this point be considered satisfactory, the Emperor was willing to cast a veil over the questionable proceedings connected with his accession to the throne, and at once to acknowledge him as King of Spain and the Indies.

Though Savary brought with him no credentials, nor was the bearer of any answer to the letter of Ferdinand notifying his accession, the terms of the communication were too gratifying not to be warmly welcomed by the Monarch. It had never been the intention of Ferdinand to separate his policy from that of

CHAP. III. France, and assurances of unshaken fidelity were

1808. accordingly given to the Envoy.

April. By Savary, Ferdinand was informed that Napoleon was already on his route to Madrid. He had in fact quitted Paris on the second of April. Instant preparations were accordingly made for his reception in the capital. Guards of honour were appointed to escort him in his progress; nor did it occur to the Spanish Monarch or his ministers to doubt the truth of intelligence thus apparently corroborated. The entreaties of Beauharnois and Murat, that the King should quit his capital to welcome his formidable ally, were again renewed, and at length successful. Ferdinand fell into the snare. He was assured it would be unnecessary to extend his journey beyond Burgos, where he would certainly be met by Napoleon. He accordingly set forth; and the Emperor not having yet entered the Spanish territory, Ferdinand was persuaded to extend his journey to Vittoria. On his arrival, he received a letter from Napoleon, and learned that he was still at Bayonne. The communication was in a very different spirit from what his hopes had led

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him to anticipate. It cautioned him to beware of using popular violence as an instrument of power, and censured the part he had taken in encouraging the tumults of Aranjuez and Madrid.

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The advice of one in a situation to command, is generally unpalatable; and Ferdinand did not want counsel but encouragement. The letter gave him little. Napoleon did not address him as a sovereign, nor commit himself by any acknowledgment of his title. He hinted that the circumstances of Ferdinand's accession were full of suspicion, and that the abdication of Charles bore strong evidence of compulsion. Little disposed as he might be, to participate in such suspicions, it had become necessary, for the satisfaction of Europe, that the recognition of his rights should be preceded by an elaborate investigation of all the circumstances by which his assumption of royal authority had been accompanied. The letter, moreover, conveyed a strong expression of opinion, that the prosecution of Godoy should immediately cease. It was impossible he could be brought to trial without eliciting disclosures injurious at once to the interests of the Prince, and disgraceful to his parents. "Beware," said Napo-

CHAP. III. leon, " of adopting a policy of which you may
1808. yourself become the victim. Your Royal High-
April. ness has no title to the throne but that derived
from your mother. Should the process dishon-
our her, your own rights must be the sacrifice.
Shut your ears to perfidious counsels. You can-
not prosecute the Prince of Peace without dan-
ger to your crown. You have no right to
try him ; the crimes with which he is reproached
are lost in those of the throne. I have often ex-
pressed a wish that he should be removed from
the direction of affairs, though my friendship for
King Charles made me anxious to shut my eyes
on his weak attachment. Miserable men that
we are ! Weakness and error are the badge of
all our tribe !* Your Royal Highness," reiterated
the document, "should beware of popular com-
motions. Through their means, some murders
may be committed on the soldiers of my army ;
but the ruin of Spain will be the consequence. I
have already seen with pain that every thing has

* It is not often we find Napoleon in the moralizing vein, and this singular specimen of Imperial hypocrisy, is therefore curious enough. One can scarcely read it without participating in the fervid disgust of Sir Peter Teazle, to any thing smacking of fine *sentiment*. It betrays at least, the low estimation in which Napoleon held the understanding of his correspondent.

been done at Madrid to inflame the public feeling ; and that certain letters of the Captain-General of Catalonia, tending to interrupt the existing harmony between France and Spain, have been industriously circulated through the kingdom."

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This remarkable letter concludes with the following menace and benediction, which are probably not equally entitled to the praise of sincerity : " I have now opened to your Royal Highness my whole mind ; and you may perceive I have hitherto hesitated between conflicting motives ; but decision is at length necessary.

" I pray God, my brother, that he may have you in his high and holy keeping."

The receipt of such a letter did not tend in any degree to allay the apprehensions of Ferdinand. From Vittoria he would willingly have returned to Madrid ; but surrounded on all hands by the French armies, there was danger even in retreat. To the adoption of this course, however, he was strongly urged by the faithful servants who accompanied him in his journey. Various projects were devised for his escape, but Ferdinand rejected them all. In vain did his counsellors appeal to his pride, and ask whether

CHAP. III. the monarch of Spain and the Indies would submit to the public degradation of entering, without invitation, without suitable preparation, or any of the formalities which became his dignity, the dominions of a foreign sovereign, by whom he had not yet been recognised as King. The pride of Ferdinand was overbalanced by his fears. Influenced by the promise of Savary, that his arrival at Bayonne would be immediately followed by the Imperial recognition, and by dread lest his return to the capital might tend still further to alienate Napoleon from his cause, he at length decided on the perilous measure of continuing his journey.

Apr. 20. Ferdinand on his arrival at Bayonne, was received by the Emperor with every demonstration of respect. He dined at the same table with his host, and was treated with all the observances due to royalty. Scarcely, however, had he retired to his residence, when Savary, by the falsehood of whose promises he had already been so fatally deluded, apprized him of the irrevocable decision of Napoleon for the expulsion of the Bourbon dynasty, and required that he should instantly sign an abdication of the crown. Astounded by this sudden and unexpected demand, Ferdinand

refused compliance ; and supported by the advice
of those intrepid counsellors by whom he was ac-
companied, he declared his unalterable resolution
that no exercise of power should draw from him
the surrender of his rights.

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But Napoleon too thoroughly understood the character of his victim, to be deterred from the prosecution of his views by this temporary demonstration of firmness. Every engine was employed, to render the advisers of Ferdinand subservient to his purposes—and to their honour be it recorded—in vain. The petty kingdom of Etruria, of which the rightful sovereign had been deprived by the treaty of Fontainebleau, was tendered as an equivalent for Spain and the Indies, and at once rejected by the Council. In vain did Napoleon exert his powers of argument and corruption ; in vain did he attempt to intimidate and overawe the men, who though open to his vengeance, yet dared to oppose a barrier to the schemes of his ambition : the counsellors of Ferdinand remained alike impregnable to his persuasion, promises, and threats. They refused to compromise the honour of their country, or the rights of its monarch ; and it soon became evident

CHAP. III. that another course was necessary for the attainment of his views.

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Such occurrences, it will be readily believed, did not contribute to enliven the residence of Ferdinand at Bayonne; and Cevallos was accordingly directed to notify to the French Minister of State, the intention of the Spanish Monarch to re-enter his dominions. To this communication no answer was returned, though the measure immediately adopted of doubling the guards by which his residence was surrounded, was in itself a practical response, which could scarcely be considered as equivocal.

In the meanwhile, the chief authority at Madrid had been assumed by Murat. Shortly after the departure of the King, a military requisition for the instant release of Godoy was transmitted to the government. It was stated, by Murat, in explanation of this extraordinary demand, that as Charles IV. alone could be recognised by Napoleon as monarch of Spain, it was considered necessary for the public tranquillity, that the Prince of Peace should be removed from the kingdom, in order that the counsels of the King should no longer be perverted by his pernicious interference.

With this authoritative requisition, the fears of the Council of Government induced them to comply. Godoy was accordingly removed by night from the prison of Villa Viciosa, and sent off under a strong escort to Bayonne.

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The departure of Godoy was speedily followed by that of Charles and the Queen, whose presence Napoleon considered necessary to the further prosecution of his schemes. The appearance of these new personages on the scene, produced a considerable change in the character of the drama then acting at Bayonne. All his former ascendancy over the minds of the Royal pair was reassumed by Godoy; and, with hatred exasperated doubtless by the memory of his recent sufferings, he became a willing instrument of Napoleon in depriving Ferdinand of the crown. Nor were Charles and his consort without a deep and resentful remembrance of the unnatural conduct of their son. In bursting bonds of filial duty he had likewise broken those of parental attachment; and, influenced by the counsels of Godoy, Charles and the Queen were now prepared to join in unnatural coalition with the destroyer of their house, and

Apr. 24.

CHAP. III. lend support to any measures by which the
downfal of Ferdinand could be effected.

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From the period of the arrival of Charles, Ferdinand was no longer treated with the honours of sovereignty. By the agents of Napoleon, by whom he was surrounded, he was even denied the most common and perfunctory observances of decent respect. Denounced as a rebel to his father, and the usurper of his power, his ear was only visited by threats of punishment, which instant obedience could alone avert.

Apr. 30.

Thus surrounded by dangers, from which it seemed impossible to escape, Ferdinand was induced by his counsellors to address a letter to Charles, in which, while he continued to assert his right to the throne, he offered, on his return to Madrid, to resign his claims in presence of the Cortes, or other high authorities of the kingdom. This mode of proceeding, however, which was, in truth, little else than an appeal to the sentiments of the nation, was not at all in harmony with the projects of Napoleon. The offer was accordingly declined; and the ingratitude and contumacy of Ferdinand were somewhat prolixly set forth in a letter bearing

the signature of Charles, which, exhibiting in some portions strong marks of the peculiar and emphatic style of Napoleon, is abundantly distinguished in others by the feebleness of his own. To this communication Ferdinand transmitted an immediate reply, vindicating his conduct and motives from the charges of his accusers. He once more testified his readiness to resign the crown in presence of the Cortes ; or, should his father, from personal infirmity, not chuse again to assume the duties of sovereignty, he was willing to govern the kingdom as his deputy, and in his name.

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This answer of the Prince produced no mitigation either of the menaces or persecutions of his enemies. On the day following, Napoleon had a long interview with Charles and the Queen, to which Ferdinand was summoned. Some particulars of this conference have been recorded by Cevallos. By those whom power had constituted his judges, and evil passions his accusers, Ferdinand was treated as a culprit, and made the object of the most vehement and disgusting abuse. Charles asserted his usurpation ; the Queen denied his legitimacy ; and Napoleon, by

May 6.

CHAP. III. an alternation of threats and promises, endeavoured to extract from his victim an unconditional abdication of the crown.

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Considering the circumstances of his situation, it is not surprising that the resolution of Ferdinand should at length have yielded. On the same day he gave his signature to a document containing an absolute renunciation of his rights to the throne. A similar resignation of their claims was extracted from the other branches of the Royal Family; and thus, by a series of the most flagrant violations of the vital principles of law, the legal restoration of Charles to the sovereignty of Spain was considered as complete. These disgraceful transactions were accompanied by a joint address of Ferdinand and the Infantes, Don Antonio and Don Carlos, to the Spanish nation, in which they formally absolved them from their allegiance, and exhorted them to conform implicitly to the new order of events.

Even before the completion of this formal mockery, Charles had become disqualified for the
App. No. 11. re-assumption of the crown. By a treaty which bears date the fifth of May, he had already

conveyed his rights to Napoleon. By an edict on the day preceding, addressed to the supreme Junta at Madrid, he had likewise delegated Murat to act as Lieutenant of the Kingdom, and President of the Council of Government. A proclamation to the people accompanied this document. They were assured that the King was engaged in concerting with his ally the measures best calculated to promote the prosperity of Spain; and they were warned, on pain of signal punishment, to reject the perfidious counsels of those turbulent disturbers who endeavoured to excite enmity against France. "Trust to my experience," said this miserable instrument of foreign tyranny, "and obey that authority which I hold from God and my fathers. Follow my example, and believe, that in your present situation there is no prosperity or safety for the Spanish nation, but in the friendship of the great Emperor, our ally."

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In a rescript addressed to the Councils of Castile and the Inquisition, Charles publicly notified to the nation his final abdication of the throne, in favour of his friend and ally the Emperor of the French. With this act the political life of

App. No. 12.

App. No. 13.

CHAP. III. Charles terminated. He soon after went into

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retirement at Compiègne, where, supported by a pension from Napoleon, he passed the remainder of his life. Ferdinand and his brother Don Carlos were dismissed to the Chateau of Valencey, in which they remained securely guarded till the return of better times. Godoy, the weak, sensual, and depraved instrument of his country's ruin, deprived of his wealth and honours, was saved only from the sufferings of abject poverty by the bounty of that monarch whose confidence he had abused.

Thus have the chief victims of Napoleon's tyrannical ambition at length vanished from the scene. Many of the details of those events with which their history is intimately connected, must have been felt by the reader to be at once painful and degrading. But a new era is now about to commence. The pictures of human weakness, guilt, and suffering, which he is still destined to behold, will at least be partially redeemed by noble and animating examples of heroic courage and devoted zeal. He will gaze on a horizon, clouded indeed, but never wholly overcast; and he will watch the dim twilight of the coming glory, as it grad-

ually brightens into that flood of radiance, by which the name and arms of his country shall continue to be illustrated, till all written and traditional records of this memorable contest be swept into oblivion.

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CHAPTER IV.

COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES IN
SPAIN.

CHAP. IV. THE departure of Ferdinand spread alarm
through the nation. The French had hitherto
1808. been regarded as allies, and the presence of fo-
April. reign armies had excited in the people neither
jealousy nor alarm. There was no press in
Spain. Public proclamations were the only re-
cognised channels by which intelligence could be
circulated through the provinces; and the infor-
mation of the people was seldom suffered to ex-
tend to the political relations of the kingdom.
A despotic government delights in the ignorance
of its subjects. It is on ignorance alone that it
can rely for unhesitating submission to its will;
and it had long been the policy of the Spanish

government to obstruct every channel of know- CHAP. IV.
ledge by which the people might be raised to a
higher rank in the scale of intelligence.

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It was long, therefore, before the body of the nation became aware of the extent to which the encroachments of their invaders had been carried, or of the purposes they were directed to effect. The progress of the French armies had been silent though sure, swift, yet calm and unruffled. The people in one province were ignorant of the events simultaneously passing in another. In beholding the occupation of one fortress, they did not know that this assumption of power was neither isolated nor incidental, but formed part of a skilful and connected scheme of usurpation, by which the independence of the country was to be overthrown. They saw but one link of the chain by which they were intralled; and, habituated to tranquil and unthinking submission, their dreams of security had even in the midst of danger remained unbroken.

But this was not always to be. The burden of the maintenance of the French armies pressed heavily on the people of the provinces. Their invaders, emboldened by success, became haughty and overbearing; and occasional acts of violence

CHAP. IV. and rapacity, which the enforcement of the strict-
 1808. est discipline could not always prevent, contri-
 April. buted to break the harmony which had hitherto
 subsisted between the military and the populace.
 These evils had been progressively increasing.
 Foy. Not a day passed in which Castilian pride was not
 wounded by the military arrogance of the in-
 truders. The fire which thus smouldered in the
 bosoms of the people, occasionally burst forth
 into a flame. Hostile rencontres ensued, not
 always unattended with bloodshed ; and a spirit
 of national animosity took place of the ancient
 favour with which France had been regarded.

To these feelings the abduction of their Mon-
 arch, and the liberation of the Prince of the Peace,
 gave additional strength and bitterness. The
 Governors of the provinces yet unoccupied, began
 spontaneously to collect arms, and prepare
 measures of defence. In the name of their im-
 prisoned Sovereign there was a talisman of
 sufficient power to rouse the sleeping energies
 of the nation. There was indignation in every
 heart, and defiance on every lip. The signs of
 the times were no longer to be mistaken ; and it
 was evident that the crisis of struggle was at
 length come.

The French on their part neglected no pre-
caution by which their security could be promot-
ed. The division of General Vedel was direct-
ed to march from Segovia to the Escorial; and the
lines of communication with the capital were
strengthened. Dupont was ordered to transfer
the head quarters of his army from Aranjuez to
Toledo; and the troops in the neighbourhood of
Madrid were kept in constant readiness to bear
with all their power on the people, in case of
tumult or insurrection.

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It had already been publicly announced that
the Emperor refused to acknowledge Ferdinand,
and that Charles was about to reassume
the reins of sovereignty. At Toledo this intel-
ligence was followed by a riot. Crowds collect-
ed in the great square of the city, and cries of
"*Ferdinand the Seventh, for ever,*" rent the air.
A flag bearing the picture of the King was the
banner of this tumultuous assemblage, which,
armed with musquets, pikes, and bludgeons,
paraded the city, inflicting vengeance on those
whose sentiments were conceived hostile to the
restoration of Ferdinand. The house of the
Corregidor was attacked and plundered, and that
functionary with difficulty effected his escape.

CHAP. IV. In a few days the division of Dupont arrived in the city. Doubtful of the temper of the inhabitants, he advanced in order of attack, ready on any apparent symptom of popular resistance to act on the offensive. But quiet had already been restored. The Princess of the Peace, accompanied by the Cardinal de Bourbon, came forth to meet the General in the neighbourhood of the city, and informed him that the efforts of the municipal authorities, aided by those of the clergy, had already been successful in quelling the tumults. From this demonstration of popular feeling no immediate consequences followed; but it indicated to the French leaders the necessity of increasing their forces in that neighbourhood; and another division of Dupont's army was accordingly advanced to Aranjuez.

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But the chief precautions of the invaders were directed to the maintenance of the capital. From the time of Ferdinand's departure, all harmony between the military and the inhabitants was at an end.* The intelligence subsequently received, of the proceedings at Bayonne, had the effect of rousing to its highest pitch the indignation of the people. Their imprisoned monarch was the engrossing subject of their thoughts. When a

courier was expected to arrive from France, immense crowds surrounded the post-house, and waited with intense anxiety to receive intelligence of his safety. The French generals, alarmed at these tumultuous masses, endeavoured to divert their attention, and to conceal the real character of the transactions at Bayonne. In both these objects they were unsuccessful. The falsehoods of the public journals were discredited and detected; and private letters, containing a true description of the passing events, were circulated through the city. The situation of the French was that of men on the brink of a volcano, when the portents of an approaching eruption are already manifest.

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Foy ii. 173.

In such a state of things it appeared to Murat that strong measures were necessary to tame the spirit of the people. The natives of Madrid had engaged in frequent rencontres with the French soldiers; and blood had been shed. The spirit of loyalty had penetrated even into the mad houses; and lunatics rushed forth into the street to assassinate the enemies of their country.

It was natural that the antipathy of the people should generate similar sentiments in the French armies. The soldiers already regarded the par-

CHAP. IV. tisans of Ferdinand as enemies, and were even
1808. anxious for a conflict, the successful termination
April. of which they regarded as undoubted. Their
wishes were soon gratified. On the 30th of April,
Murat presented to the Infante Don Antonio,
president of the Junta of Government, a letter
from Charles, requiring him to send off the Queen
of Etruria, and the Infante Don Francisco de
Paula, brother of Ferdinand, to Bayonne. With
this mandate the Junta at first declined com-
pliance, till the pleasure of the King should be
known. But their scruples were overruled by
Murat, who declared himself ready to assume the
whole responsibility of the proceeding, and inti-
mated that any opposition to his commands would
be repressed by the full exercise of his power.

The time appointed for the departure of these
Royal personages came. On the preceding day no
intelligence had been received from Bayonne ;
and this circumstance had contributed to deepen
the anxiety of the people. Early in the morning
great multitudes assembled at the Puerta del Sol,
waiting in a state of great excitement for the
arrival of the expected courier ; and the square
in front of the palace was crowded with women,
who watched with melancholy earnestness the

preparations for the journey of the Royal travellers. At nine o'clock the *cortege* set forth. It was reported that Don Antonio was likewise about to quit the capital for Bayonne; and two carriages, which still remained at the palace, evidently prepared for travel, gave support to the rumour. The fermentation of the populace was now excited to the highest pitch. The cry, "*They are all forsaking us; the last of the family of our kings is about to be torn from the country!*" flew from lip to lip; and a violent commotion was the consequence. The servants of the palace declared that Don Francisco had betrayed reluctance to depart, and even wept bitterly. On hearing this the women burst into tears; and the men, almost frantic, fell upon the carriages, and broke them to pieces.

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At this moment a French officer, who had been sent to ascertain the cause of the tumult, appeared in the crowd. He was indicated by his dress to belong to the staff of Murat. The sorrowful exclamations of the mob were at once changed into expressions of indignant hatred. The officer was immediately attacked, and would probably have become the sacrifice of popular fury, had he not been rescued by a patrol of

CHAP. IV. the Imperial Guard, which succeeded, by a

1808. charge of bayonets, in driving back his assail-
May. ants.

The affair now began to wear a serious aspect ; and the piquet battalion on duty for the day was immediately ordered out by Murat. They fired on the people ; but this had only the effect of increasing their numbers. The whole population of the city rushed into the streets. The air became vocal with cries of “ *Vengeance !* ” “ *Death to the French !* ” “ *Ferdinand the Seventh for ever !* ” and accumulating masses came pouring on, armed with such weapons as they had been able to procure, and prepared to join in the onslaught. Stones were thrown, and musquets fired from the windows. A party of Mamelukes of the Guard was massacred by the mob, and every French soldier found straggling in the streets met a similar fate.

The whole troops in the city were now under arms ; artillery was planted in the squares, and a destructive fire of musquetry and grape-shot opened on the multitude. The Plaza Mayor, the Puerta del Sol, and the great street of Alcala, were the chief theatres of slaughter. Terrified by the havoc, the people would have sought

safety in flight, but even this was denied them. CHAP. IV.

They were charged and sabred by the cavalry, and fired upon by bodies of infantry stationed at the intersecting points of the streets, in order to intercept their retreat. Thus driven to extremity, they rushed into the houses, where they were followed by their pursuers, and put mercilessly to the sword. Parties of cavalry were stationed at the outlets of the city, to charge and cut down those who had succeeded in escaping from the scene of slaughter within.

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While the work of extermination was thus vigorously carried on, Murat had taken post on the height of St. Vincent, which commands the western part of the city. Thither he was followed by several members of the Junta, who implored him to put a stop to the effusion of blood. O'Farrel and Azanza, accompanied by many of the nobles and French officers of rank, rode through the streets, endeavouring to restore tranquillity, and waving white handkerchiefs as a token of peace. By their personal exertions, many lives were saved ; but the firing in the streets still continued till not a Spaniard was to be seen. By two o'clock, however, hostilities had ceased, and all was silent in

CHAP. IV. Madrid. Towards evening a body of peasantry from the neighbouring villages, on approaching the capital, were charged and fired on by the military. Many were killed ; a still greater number wounded by the sabres, and trampled down by the horses of the cavalry.

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In the events just narrated, the Spanish troops took no part. They were detained in barracks by their officers ; and a small body of artillery, stationed at the gate of the Arsenal, was the only part of the garrison which attempted to co-operate with the people. Their conduct, and that of the gallant men by whom they were commanded, is worthy of record.

At an early period of the conflict, a detachment was directed by Murat to seize possession of the Arsenal. The execution of this order was opposed by two officers of artillery named Daoiz and Velarde, who, assisted by their fellow soldiers, harnessed themselves to the cannon, and succeeded in bringing three pieces to bear on a French column then advancing to enforce the execution of their orders.. A discharge of grape-shot followed, which made such havoc in the ranks that the French instantly retreated. In consequence of this disaster, fresh columns were

instantly advanced ; but before they succeeded in obtaining possession of the neighbouring houses, many discharges had taken place with terrible effect. The guns were at length taken. Velarde was killed on the spot ; and Daoiz, though severely wounded and unable to stand, continued to give orders, till he had received three other wounds, the last of which was instantly fatal.

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On the termination of active hostilities, Murat was not satisfied with the punishment already inflicted on the inhabitants, and determined yet further to signalize his vengeance. On the evening of the same day, and on the following morning, the prisoners were brought before a military tribunal of which General Grouchy was president, and sentenced to be shot. The scene selected for the display of this terrible example, was in the neighbourhood of the Prado ; and upwards of an hundred individuals were led forth to execution, without being suffered in their dying moments to receive the last offices of religion.*

* It has been stated by Colonel Napier, on the authority of several French writers, that these executions are attributable not to Murat but to Grouchy, who continued the work of

CHAP. IV. It is admitted on all hands that many of the
1808. sufferers were entirely innocent of participation
May. in the tumults, and were convicted on no other
evidence than that of large knives being found
on their persons. Forty-five Catalan traders,
taken in the street of Alcala, were with difficul-
ty rescued from death by the interference of the
authorities, who assured the French officers, that
the privilege of carrying arms is one enjoyed by
the Catalan merchants, and sanctioned by the
laws of the kingdom. The trials indeed—if the
few hasty formalities which preceded the inflic-
tion of sentence deserve such a name—seem to
have been intended to serve rather as a warrant
for indiscriminate execution, than to afford pro-
tection to the innocent.

With regard to the number of the sufferers in
this unfortunate affray, there is much variance
of statement. It is generally asserted by the
Spaniards that upwards of ten thousand of their

slaughter on his own responsibility, and in direct disobedience to
the orders of his commander. The statement would have cer-
tainly been entitled to greater credit, had we learned from the
same authority that the delinquency of Grouchy had been fol-
lowed by censure or disgrace. •

countrymen bled on the occasion. In the ac- CHAP. IV.
count of the transaction given in the *Moniteur*,
the loss of the French was estimated at twenty- 1808.
five killed, and about twice that number wound- May.
ed: that of the Spaniards at "*plusieurs mil-
liers des plus mauvais sujets du pays.*" Subse-
quently, however, when it was deemed politic to
diminish rather than to exaggerate the extent of
the casualties, a report was drawn up by the
Council of Castile, and published by order of
Murat, which reduced the number of Spanish
sufferers to one hundred and ninety-three.
From statements so widely at variance, it is im-
possible to draw any satisfactory conclusion.
Nor is it necessary. Taken at the lowest esti-
mate, enough will remain to rouse our warmest
sympathy with the people in their first ineffec-
tual effort to cast off the yoke of bondage which
pressed them to the earth. We have no wish
to magnify the atrocities of the French. We are
far from supposing Murat to have been actuated
on this occasion by an abstract and constitutional
appetite for blood, at variance with the whole
tenour of his life. Murat was a soldier, and a
brave one, and adorned with all the splendid
qualities which belong to that character; but,

CHAP. IV. little influenced by principle, and accustomed,

1808. on all occasions of honourable danger, to hold
May. his life at a pin's fee, he was led, perhaps, to
place less value on the lives of others, when
their sacrifice could contribute to the advantage of his cause, than any system of ethics, however lax, would pretend to justify. Murat was no statesman. He probably believed, that a striking and terrible example was necessary to intimidate the people, and secure the future safety of his army. The cause of injustice must often be supported by unjustifiable means. *Per fas aut nefas*, is ever the motto of usurpation; and the crimes it engenders may generally be considered less as emanations of the evil passions of individuals, than as necessary consequences of the system they support.

The immediate effects of the events of the second of May, were such as Murat had anticipated. Astounded by the scenes of bloodshed of which their city had been made the theatre, the inhabitants of Madrid remained in a state of gloomy submission to a power which experience had taught them it was impossible to resist. In the meanwhile, the French relaxed nothing of the rigour of their sway. The people were no

longer allowed to congregate in the streets or squares of the city ; and any unusual assemblage was immediately dispersed by strong military patrols. The public proclamations which promised amnesty for the past, contained likewise denunciations of the heaviest punishment on any repetition of the offence.

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If the people, however, were silent, it was not so with their rulers. Humble addresses were presented by all the public authorities. The Council of the Inquisition denounced the censures of religion on all the instigators of "such excesses as the scandalous sedition of the second of May." Don Antonio, the President of the Junta, followed his family to Bayonne ; and the authority of the usurpers in Madrid remained paramount and unquestioned.

It was in this state of things, that the order constituting Murat Lieutenant of the Kingdom, arrived in Madrid, accompanied by a proclamation, exhorting the people to yield implicit obedience to his authority. These documents were speedily followed by another, conveying intelligence of Ferdinand's resignation. To the mandate for the appointment of Murat, the Council offered no opposition ; and that leader was formally in-

CHAP. IV. stalled in an office the powers of which he had already virtually exercised.

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Ferdinand, before signing the deed of abdication at Bayonne, had taken the precaution of despatching a private messenger to the Junta, informing them of the real nature of his situation, and the compulsory measures which had been adopted to enforce the resignation of his rights. He directed that hostilities should instantly commence, on intelligence being received of his removal into the interior of France ; a measure to which, unless compelled by violence, he declared he never would consent. The Cortes were likewise ordered to be convoked, in order that such steps might be adopted as would communicate the greatest vigour to the measures of national resistance.

This communication from their Sovereign was not received by the Junta till two days after the investiture of Murat as chief of the government; and it was unanimously decided by that body, that the orders of Ferdinand could no longer be obeyed. By this decision, the Junta was at once deprived of all influence with the nation ; and instead of holding its authority by appointment from an independent sovereign, be-

came degraded into the passive instrument of foreign tyranny. CHAP. IV.

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The terrors of the military executions at Madrid did not extend beyond the capital. In the provinces they excited only more vehement hatred of the invaders. Murat, however, was not idle. Two Swiss regiments, which formed part of the garrison of Madrid, were incorporated with the army of Dupont. Three companies of the Body Guard, and four battalions of the Spanish and Walloon Guards, were placed at the disposal of Marshal Moncey. Three thousand of the Spanish army were ordered to embark at Ferrol for South America; and in the more important fortresses of Catalonia the garrisons were reduced and weakened. Orders were issued for the army of Solano, which had not yet entered Portugal, to march on Cadiz, and its commander was directed to resume his functions as Captain-General of Andalusia. The heights of the Retiro at Madrid were strongly fortified, and supplied with large stores of ammunition and provisions. All magazines of arms and warlike equipment were seized by the French authorities; and officers were des-

CHAP. IV. patched to Ceuta, to cause the recognition of the new government in that important fortress.

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In the meanwhile, Napoleon had formed the resolution of elevating his brother Joseph to the throne of Spain. . Joseph was then King of Naples; and by the mildness of his manners and the leniency of his government, had succeeded in acquiring, in a considerable degree, the affections of his subjects. Of retired habits, and fitted by his tastes rather for the pursuits of philosophy than for those of ambition, he would willingly have declined the dangerous elevation; but his refusal was overruled by Napoleon, and Joseph yielded to the influence of that ascendancy which stronger minds had found it impossible to resist.

Intelligence of the Emperor's intentions no sooner crossed the Pyrenees, than addresses of the most humble and adulatory character poured in from the public authorities of the kingdom. The Junta of Government, the Council of Castile, the Municipality of Madrid, all entreated for the honour of a King of the Imperial blood; and in this they were joined by the Cardinal Archbishop de Bourbon, the only male branch of the

Royal family in the kingdom. Thus secure in CHAP. IV.
 the servility of the higher classes, and their entire devotion to his will, Napoleon thought it prudent that the work of usurpation should be sanctioned by at least a semblance of national consent. He accordingly convoked an assembly of one hundred and fifty of the chief persons of the kingdom to meet at Bayonne, and addressed the Spanish people in the following proclamation.

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“ Spaniards, after a long agony your nation was perishing. I have seen your sufferings,— I will relieve them.—Your greatness and power are inseparably connected with mine.—Your princes have ceded to me all their rights to the Crown. I will not reign over your provinces, but I will acquire an eternal title to the love and gratitude of your posterity. Your monarchy is old. It must be restored to youth, that you may enjoy the blessings of a renovation which shall not be purchased by civil war or calamity. Spaniards, I have convoked a general assembly of the deputies of your provinces and towns, that I may know your wishes and your wants. I shall then lay down my rights, and place your illustrious crown on the brows

CHAP. IV. of one who bears resemblance to myself: thus

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securing to you a constitution which will unite the salutary power of the Sovereign, with the protection of the liberties and rights of the Spanish nation. It is my wish that my memory should be blessed by your latest posterity, and that they shall say, ‘ Napoleon was the regenerator of our country.’ ”

By these proceedings the Spanish nation was at length effectually roused into resistance. The hatred of the people towards their invaders, broke forth, as it were, in one loud and simultaneous burst, from all quarters of the kingdom. They would not tamely submit to become the subject of perfidious barter between the servile government of Madrid and that of France. They would not transfer their allegiance at the command of a foreign tyrant, from the heir of the Bourbons, to an upstart and an adventurer. The *fusillade* of the second of May, and the disgraceful transactions at Bayonne, put an end to that state of torpid quiescence in which the spirit of the nation had so long slumbered. A loud and intelligible voice was at once sent forth from every province in the kingdom. The universal cry was for re-

sistance ; and the pervading sentiment of every heart, was loyalty to Ferdinand, their betrayed and imprisoned monarch.

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The provinces of Asturias and Galicia were the first to take arms. A representative Junta was assembled at Oviedo, and assumed the sovereignty of the district. To quiet these disturbances, Count Delpinar, councillor of Castile, and Don Juan Melendez, were commissioned by Murat to collect the forces of the district, and quell by military power the spirit of insurrection. But it was too late. The functionaries were attacked by the people, and compelled to seek safety in flight. The first act of the Junta was to despatch two deputies to England, in order to engage assistance from that power ; and measures were immediately adopted to arrange plans of concert and co-operation with the neighbouring provinces.

Leon started next into the field, and sent deputies to Corunna requesting arms. The demand was not complied with. Don Antonio Filangieri, a Neapolitan by birth, and Captain General of Galicia, was unwilling to commit himself by any act of hostility to France ; and his temporizing policy having rendered him an

CHAP. IV. object of aversion, the mob broke into his house,

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seized his papers, and, had he not prudently withdrawn, it is probable his life would have been sacrificed to the popular fury. A portrait of Ferdinand was carried in procession through the streets of Corunna, and the cry of "*Down with the French and the traitors,*" was heard on all hands.

In Estremadura the rising of the people was no less decided and tumultuous. The Count de la Torre del Fresno, Governor of Badajoz, endeavoured to controul the spirit of insubordination, and lost his life in the attempt. The populace dragged him from his house, and murdered him in the street. At Valladolid, Jaen, Saragossa, Carthagena, San Lucar, Salamanca, Carolina, Ciudad Rodrigo, and many other places, excesses equally horrible occurred. Like a river which has burst its channel, the evil passions of the people rushed onward, without limit or restraint.

By such revolting acts of atrocity was the cause of freedom at this period injured and dishonoured. They cannot be defended; they ought not to be concealed. Yet even the ferocities of a people, thus goaded into madness by

a long course of injury and insult, will weigh lightly in the balance when compared with the cold-blooded and barbarous policy of their invaders. In recording the events of this extraordinary struggle, it is indeed the duty of the historian to render justice to the oppressor; but his sympathies are due only to the cause of the oppressed. And if, by the very constitution of our being, it is necessary we should be influenced by prejudice, that prejudice is at least more generous which leans to the side of freedom in the contest, than that which would veil the crimes, while it blazons the triumphs of the usurper.

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Fortunately, however, this state of anarchy was of short duration. In the principal cities of the provinces, Juntas were speedily formed for the provincial administration of affairs, and to direct and organize the resistance of the people. These assemblies published proclamations and addresses to their countrymen, inciting them to the vigorous assertion of their rights, and the vindication of the national honour. They recalled to their recollection the heroic deeds of their ancestors, and the noble struggles which they had maintained against the Moorish invaders in the cause of freedom

CHAP. IV. and religion. They painted in its true light
the insidious and grasping policy of Napoleon.
1808. "It is better," said the Junta of Galicia, "to
May. die in defence of our hearths and altars, on our
own soil, and with arms in our hands, than
to be led bound to slaughter, the unresisting
victims of bloody and inordinate ambition.
The conscription of France awaits us. If we
do not defend our own kingdom, we must go
to perish in the north. By resistance we lose
nothing; for should our efforts in behalf of our
country prove fruitless, by a glorious death we
shall at least be freed from the galling chains of
the oppressor. Fly to arms then, and assist
your countrymen to rescue your King from
captivity, to restore to your government its just
rights, to preserve your families, to assert the
independence of your native soil, and above all
to defend your sacred Religion. Employ the
arms which she tenders; nerve your minds with
the fear of God; implore the aid of the blessed
Virgin, and of our patron the glorious St. James.
Under such auspices go forth confident of suc-
cess, and grasp the victory which is prepared for
you by their intercession, and the eternal jus-
tice of your cause."

The addresses of the other assemblies were not less energetic ; nor less happy in contrasting the war in which they had been compelled to take arms by all the holiest motives that can sanctify a cause, with those in which Napoleon had plunged his country, to gratify the frantic dictates of an insatiable ambition.

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Among the provincial Juntas formed by the necessity of the times, that of Seville assumed the lead, and styled themselves, in public proclamations, “ The Supreme Government of Spain and the Indies.” Seville possessed at that time many claims to become the chief *nucleus* of the government. In point of influence and population it was the second city of Spain. It possessed the only foundery for cannon in the kingdom. It abounded in arms and military stores ; and it possessed likewise the advantage of being removed from the immediate sphere of the influence of the French armies.

With such favouring circumstances to lend influence to its measures, the Supreme Junta lost no time in organizing a system of resistance suited to the exigencies of the country. They directed that in every town containing two thousand inhabitants, a subordinate Junta

CHAP. IV. should be established, to enlist under the national standard all those capable of bearing arms.

1808. Defensive measures were concerted by the chief
May. military authorities of the province. War was declared against France. Vessels were despatched to the Canaries and South America to announce the rising of the people; and commissioners were sent into the southern provinces of Portugal, in order to solicit assistance and co-operation. The Junta also published a series of precautionary rules for the conduct of the war, distinguished throughout by practical knowledge of the art military, and a prudent adaptation of its principles to the situation of the kingdom.

But not the least important step taken by the Supreme Junta was that of opening communications with Sir Hew Dalrymple, Governor of Gibraltar, and the British Admiral on the Cadiz station. Every assistance, in the power of these officers to grant, was immediately afforded to the patriots. Admiral Purvis offered the assistance of the British fleet to Solano, Governor of Cadiz, in an attack on the French squadron, commanded by Admiral Rossilly, then in the harbour. This proposal of the Admiral, Solano did not

venture openly to decline, yet he felt unwilling to commit himself by any act of what he doubtless considered premature hostility to France. When Admiral Purvis therefore arrived at Cadiz, Solano, instead of concerting measures of attack with that officer, was only anxious to repress the spirit of the people, and restore harmony with their invaders. All his measures for this purpose failed signally of effect. The time for such temporizing policy had passed. Solano, in the eyes of the people, was a traitor, and they treated him as such. The mob tore him from his dwelling, and murdered him in the street. His house was rased to the ground, yet, by an impulse of singular magnanimity, his property was held inviolate by a multitude of the very meanest and poorest of his countrymen. "We will take," they exclaimed, "nothing that belonged to a traitor." Even the jewels and money they found in his possession were deposited in the public treasury, to be employed in that cause which they held Solano to have betrayed.

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On the death of Solano, the command devolved on Don Tomas de Morla; and on his accession to the government, vigorous measures were immediately adopted to compel the squadron of

CHAP. IV. Rossilly to surrender. The French Admiral, aware of his danger, made proposals to Morla, which were rejected. He wished to quit the harbour of Cadiz; and demanded protection against the English fleet then in the offing. But Morla refused all terms, declining the assistance of Lord Collingwood, who had assumed the command of the British fleet, and proceeded to erect batteries on various parts of the Isla de Leon, from which they assailed the hostile squadron with a heavy fire. These measures, after an interval of several days, during which a strong fire was kept up on the enemy, were at length productive of the desired effect. Rossilly, on the morning of the 14th of June, sent a flag of truce to the shore, and intimated his readiness to surrender at discretion.

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This success was followed by the arrival of General Spencer with a corps of five thousand men, which had been despatched from Gibraltar to co-operate with the Spaniards. By the appearance of this force on the coast, the progress of a French corps under General Avril, which had been despatched by Junot to hold possession of Cadiz, was arrested; and General Spencer having subsequently taken up a position at A-

yamonté, the garrison of Faro surrendered to the patriots. On this event, the Authorities of Algarve sent deputies to Seville, and united that province by alliance with the Supreme Junta. The patriotic force in this quarter was still further augmented by the junction of sixteen Spanish battalions, which withdrew from the occupation of Portugal and joined the standard of their countrymen.

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Previous to the appearance of General Spencer on the Spanish coast, the deputies from Seville and Galicia had arrived in England. Never was there enthusiasm more deep and general, than that which then animated the British nation in the cause of Spanish independence. The deputies were welcomed in London by loud and general acclamation. There was no hesitation manifested as to the line of policy which it became Great Britain to adopt. The people called on their rulers to assist, with heart and hand, a nation struggling for liberty, to cast off the chain of the oppressor. Never was the unanimous voice of a people poured forth with greater majesty and effect. The government did not withstand—no government could have withstood a call thus energetically made. In

CHAP. IV. such an excited state of the public mind, if their

1808. rulers had dared to oppose themselves to the
May. wishes of the nation, they must have been driven from their situations with scorn and ignominy. It mattered nothing in such a case what party was in power, or by what peculiar principles their general policy was regulated. The ordinary barriers and distinctions of party were in a moment broken down, and Whig or Tory must have acted alike in yielding instant obedience to a voice thus sublimely and irresistibly poured forth.

Since the accession of Napoleon, England had fought not for conquest but for safety. In spite of all her efforts, she had beheld the power of France continually gaining new accessions to its gigantic bulk. Europe, after a fruitless resistance, was at the foot of the conqueror, and the subsidies of England, by provoking premature hostilities, had only contributed to accelerate the catastrophe. Since the days of Egypt, the military force of England had been employed only in the conquest of Sugar Islands, or of some distant and isolated colonies which France still retained in the East. A nobler field was now open for her exertions. She was at length

to meet the Great Conqueror of the Age on the very continent he had subdued, to plant her sons breast to breast with those victorious soldiers who had never yet experienced defeat. The moment of decisive struggle was at length come, when the standard of England was to be raised in a higher and a better cause than any of which she had hitherto stood forward as the champion. Justice was on her side: the character of the contest was become too palpable to be mistaken by any party in the state. The cause of freedom and of resistance to oppression, is one that comes home with peculiar force to the heart and the understanding of an Englishman; and followed in all its measures by the unanimous wishes of the nation, the government at once knew itself to be armed with a strength, of which, during a long course of inglorious policy, it had hitherto been deprived.

Every practicable assistance was immediately afforded to the patriotic cause. Vessels, freighted with arms, clothing, and military stores, were speedily despatched for Gijon. Supplies of money were sent to Ferrol to assist the insurrection in Galicia. All the Spanish prisoners of war were liberated and restored to their

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CHAP. IV. country. The British army in Sicily was ordered to afford protection and assistance to the insurgent Catalans; and General Spencer was directed to engage in active co-operation with the patriots of Andalusia.

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While such measures were adopting in England, the Spanish people had lost nothing of their ardour in the cause of independence. Valencia became the theatre of a tragedy deeper than any which we have hitherto been called on to record. The inhabitants, like those of the other provinces, had risen in arms against the French. In the vehemence of the first commotion, Don Miguel de Saavedra became the object and the victim of popular fury. He was followed to Requena, whither he had fled for safety, and brutally murdered by the people. His head, raised on a pike, was carried with acclamations round the city of which he had recently been governor. A Junta was then elected for the administration of the province; and it is probable that Valencia might have remained undisgraced by further violence, but for the appearance of a wretch, named Calvo, by whom the functions of leader of the government had been assumed. Calvo came from Madrid, and was a canon of

the Cathedral of St. Isidore. By the display of
a sort of demoniac energy, he acquired influence
with the people. He retained, under his com-
mand, a band of assassins ; and, confident in
this support, he insulted the Junta, who refused
to admit him as a member, and succeeded in ac-
quiring such power as awed the authorities into
submission.

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In Valencia there were many French resid-
ents ; and it was natural, in the circumstances of
the country, that these should become the pe-
culiar objects of jealousy and suspicion. Alarm-
ed at the dangers which surrounded them, they
sought refuge in the citadel,* and Calvo publicly
denounced them, as having engaged in a plot
for the surrender of the city to Murat. Ac-
counts differ as to the particular proceedings
which ensued ; but all agree in the result, that
these unfortunate persons, in number about two
hundred, were massacred by Calvo and his as-
sassins.

The mad ambition of Calvo grew with his
success. He caused himself to be proclaimed
Sovereign of Valencia, summoned the Captain-
General to his presence, compelled the Intend-
ant to disburse the public money, and treated the

CHAP. IV. Archbishop with insolence and contempt. By
1808. his orders, likewise, a new Junta was directed
May. to assemble and assume the functions of that
which he had determined to abolish.

Fortunately for the interests of humanity, the career of Calvo was a short one. The Junta, which at first had been panic-stricken, began at length to gather courage, and to concert measures for the overthrow of this frantic demagogue. His popularity with the mob, already satiated with slaughter, was in the wane. The schemes of the Junta soon ripened into action. At one of their meetings, Calvo was invited to join in the deliberations. He came, followed by a train of ruffians who occupied all the avenues to the place of meeting. Towards the Junta he demeaned himself with his usual insolence, and attempted to awe them into submission by threats of punishment. At length a Franciscan friar, named Rico, the most intrepid of their number, rose and denounced him as a traitor, and demanded his immediate arrest. This was done. Calvo was sent in irons to the Island of Majorca, and subsequently executed as a traitor. The retribution of the Junta did not rest here. About two hundred of his blood-thirsty followers were

likewise subjected to trial, and executed in pursuance of the sentence awarded by the tribunal. CHAP. IV.
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It rarely happens, observes an able writer, that popular convulsions, however horrible may be the circumstances by which they are attended, have any prejudicial effect on the vigour of national defence; for the passions of the people, thus excited by domestic atrocities, when directed against foreign enemies, acquire new intensity. It was so in Valencia. The people were no sooner freed from the tyranny of Calvo, than they commenced vigorous preparations for defence. There appeared no limits to the popular enthusiasm. Provision was made not only for the security of the city, but of the province. The defiles leading into Catalonia were fortified. Troops were detached to co-operate with the military in Murcia; and active dispositions were made to secure the passes of the road from Castile.

Before intelligence was received at Madrid of the insane atrocities of Calvo and his followers, an expedition against Valencia had been in preparation. The command of the force destined for this service was intrusted to Marshal Mon-

CHAP. IV. cey, an officer of high military reputation and
 1808. unblemished personal character. On the thirtieth
 May. of May, Money received orders to advance with
 a column of ten thousand men upon Cuenca,
 where, in case the disturbances at Valencia
 should have ceased, he was directed to halt, and
 content himself with watching the country be-
 tween the lower Ebro and Carthagená. Should
 the disorders in Valencia, however, remain un-
 quelled, he was instructed to direct General
 Chabran, at Tortosa, to advance with his divi-
 sion, and effect a junction in the neighbourhood
 of Valencia.

In pursuance of these orders, Marshal Mon-
 cey, with an army of about ten thousand men of
 the different arms, set forward from Madrid on
 the fourth of June, and reached Cuenca on the
 Jun. 11. eleventh. In that town he remained for a week,
 and received intelligence of the state of mat-
 ters in Valencia. During his march, Marshal
 Money found the whole population animated
 by feelings of strong aversion to the intrusive
 government. Even around Cuenca, while it
 remained the head-quarters of his army, symp-
 toms of disaffection were daily manifested. In
 these circumstances, the Spanish and Walloon

guards were sent forward to Valencia, and Mon- CHAP. IV.
 ceys ordered Chabran to advance to Castellon de
 Plana, that a more active concert might be es-
 tablished between the armies. To a General of
 Monceys's experience it could not but be appar-
 ent that the campaign was not long destined to
 be bloodless. Not satisfied, therefore, with the
 precautions already mentioned, he wrote to Mu-
 rat, requesting that a column might be sent for-
 ward from Madrid to Albacete, to protect his
 right from attack, during his anticipated opera-
 tions.

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Murat, on his part, little aware of the difficul-
 ties with which Monceys was surrounded, felt dis-
 satisfied at the slowness of his progress. With
 a view to stimulate the sluggish movements of
 the veteran, he despatched Brigadier-General
 Excelmans, with directions to excite him by
 every means to operations of greater vigour and
 more decisive character than he had yet thought
 it prudent to undertake. Excelmans departed
 on his mission; but on his route was seized by
 the populace, and, with his suite, carried prison-
 ers into Valencia.

The difficulties of Monceys were evidently
 increasing; and on the sixteenth he quitted

Jun. 16.

CHAP. IV. Cuenca. The country around his line of march

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June.

was deserted ; and notwithstanding the strict discipline enforced in his army, the inhabitants everywhere continued to fly on his approach. No opposition, however, was offered to the advance of Moncey till he reached the bridge of Pajaso. There he found two or three thousand armed peasants, supported by a corps of about eight hundred Swiss Guards, prepared to dispute his passage, A clumsy work had been thrown up for the defence of the bridge, surmounted by four pieces of cannon ; and fortified by the difficulties of the surrounding country, which was rocky and mountainous, they stood resolutely prepared for the advance of the French. Moncey waited for the coming up of his artillery ; and then, by a vigorous attack, at once gained possession of the bridge. The Spaniards fled in confusion, leaving their cannon and about twenty prisoners in the hands of the assailants. The latter were likewise strengthened by a considerable body of the Swiss Guards, who deserted to the victors.

The next affair in which the French army was engaged, was with the force commanded by Don Joseph Caro, brother to the Marquis de la

Romana, who occupied a strong position at
 Cabrerias. The chain of mountains by which
 Valencia is separated from New-Castile form
 a rampart of great strength to that province.
 There is but one road by which they can be
 traversed by artillery, and even that presents
 difficulties of the most formidable character.
 The position which Caro had selected for his ar-
 my was one of extraordinary strength. Its front
 was secured by entrenchments ; and its flanks
 were rendered almost inaccessible by ranges of
 precipitous rocks, which appeared on either side
 to present an impenetrable rampart. The army,
 thus advantageously posted, amounted, in point
 of number, to about ten thousand ; but, with the
 exception of two regular regiments of infantry
 and a few dragoons, it was composed exclusively
 of raw and undisciplined levies, badly armed, and
 without military garb.

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To attack this position in front was impossible.
 A long detour therefore was necessary ; and a
 detachment, under General Harispe, was direct-
 ed to scale the mountains and turn the right
 flank of the Spanish army. This service was
 executed with success, though not without ex-
 treme difficulty ; and Moncey immediately ad-

CHAP. IV. vancing on the front of the position, carried it
1808. with little loss, and became master of all the
June. cannon, baggage, and ammunition of the enemy.

These difficulties past, no further obstacle seemed at first to present itself to the peaceful occupation of Valencia. The hostile army had entirely disappeared; and Moncey considered it his policy to conciliate if possible the inhabitants of the beautiful and fertile country through which he was advancing. All the prisoners not in uniform, were liberated; and he gave strong assurances to the authorities of the province, that he came only as a friend to restore tranquillity and order.

June 27. It was not till the twenty-seventh that he appeared before the walls of Valencia. That city, which is one of the largest in the kingdom, is completely enclosed by an old wall of no great height, but massive, and in good preservation. It stands upon low ground, and is surrounded by deep canals and reservoirs of water, which render approach almost impossible unless by the roads leading to the gates. About five miles from Valencia, Moncey found a body of troops under Caro entrenched on the bank of a canal, and prepared to dispute his advance. The po-

sition thus taken was strong. Several pieces of cannon commanded the road; and the peasants, who lay hid in the mulberry groves and hemp-fields on either side, harassed the march of the French army. By these obstacles, however, Moncey was not retarded. The position was immediately attacked and carried; and Moncey remained master of the suburban village of Quarte, in which he took post, and summoned the city to capitulate. But surrender was the last thing in the thoughts of the Valencians. A peremptory refusal was returned; and Moncey gave instant orders for attack. His hopes of gaining possession of Valencia did not rest exclusively on the success of his military operations. There were traitors in the city, who had promised to deliver up the gates on his approach. But these had been discovered on the night preceding the attack, and immediately put to death; and Moncey, ignorant of this circumstance, continued to expect that his efforts from without, were to be aided by treachery within.

The fire of the French batteries was directed chiefly against the gates of Quarte and San Joseph; but the troops advanced in several

CHAP. IV.

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CHAP. IV. columns in order to distract the attention of the

1808.

June.

garrison. In these circumstances, the Spanish commander had recourse to the bold stratagem of throwing open the gate of Quarte, as if to welcome the assailants. Moncey, imagining this was done by his partisans in the city, fell at once into the snare, and pushed rapidly for the gate. The advancing columns were assailed by a heavy fire of grape; and, after strenuous but ineffectual efforts to surmount the obstacles opposed to their entrance, were driven back with great loss. In the attack of San Joseph they were not more fortunate. The troops found themselves surrounded by canals which could not be crossed unless by swimming; and here too they experienced discomfiture. The heavy fire from the walls soon succeeded in silencing the French batteries; and Moncey, repulsed at all points, found it necessary to retreat.

In this affair, the loss of the French amounted to two thousand, while that of the garrison was trifling. Moncey found himself in a situation full of difficulty and peril. In the provinces of Valencia and Murcia alone the patriotic forces were in number about thirty thousand; while there remained of his army scarcely more than

five. Of Chabran and his division he could hear nothing. On all sides he was surrounded by enemies, to whom his defeat at Valencia had lent hope and vigour. His communication with Madrid was intercepted; and, to heighten his difficulties, intelligence was received on the thirtieth that the Count de Serbelloni, Captain-General of the province, was advancing, with a view to oppose his passage of the Xucar, and cut off his retreat.

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In such circumstances, instant and vigorous measures were necessary to secure the safety of the army. The first project which suggested itself to Moncey, was that of crossing the Guadalaviar, and, by entering Catalonia, to secure the co-operation of Chabran and Duhesme. But this was relinquished; and Moncey, sacrificing part of his artillery, put his army in immediate motion, with the view of attacking Serbelloni; and despatched a courier to General Chabran, with intelligence of his retreat. Two marches brought him to Alcira, about a league distant from the position on the Xucar occupied by Serbelloni. The force, under that leader, amounted to about six thousand, and consisted

CHAP. IV. chiefly of armed peasants, who, animated by
1808. the prevailing enthusiasm, had flocked to the
July. banners of their country. Both sides of the
river were occupied by this body ; and two pieces
of artillery were planted for the defence of the
bridge.

Moncey lost no time in commencing the attack. The Spaniards, on the French side of the river, were defeated with little difficulty ; but the bridge was found to have been rendered impassable for the army. At length the sluices of a canal were opened by the French, in order to draw off the waters of the Xucar, and render it fordable for the troops. This measure was successful. The cavalry crossed the river, and making a vigorous charge on the Spanish line, Serbelloni, after some resistance, found it necessary to retreat.

By this success, the only obstacle to the retreat of Moncey was removed ; and he continued his march to Albacete, where he arrived on the
Jul. 6. sixth. From thence he retired on Madrid, halting at San Clemente. At Madrid the situation of Moncey had excited considerable alarm. It was known that immediately after Moncey's ad-

vance from Cuenca, the population of that city had risen in arms, and overpowered the garrison. The brigade of Caulincourt was ordered, in consequence, to march from Tarancon to reduce the people to obedience. On his arrival at Cuenca, Caulincourt immediately attacked the insurgent army, routed them with great slaughter, and gave up the town to pillage.

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The division of General Frere was likewise despatched to the rescue of the lost Marshal and his army. Instead of remaining at Albacete, he too marched on Valencia; and, on his arrival at Requena, learned the disastrous issue of the attack on that city, and that Serbelloni was prepared to intercept the retreat of the discomfited army. This intelligence induced Frere to retreat to San Clemente, where he at length effected a junction with Moncey. Preparations were again in progress for an advance to Valencia, but these were interrupted by an order from Madrid for the return of the divisions under Caulincourt and Frere. Marshal Moncey, conceiving himself to be treated with indignity by Savary, in thus diminishing his force, quitted San Clemente, and likewise returned to the capital. Thus ended a series of operations, on the

CHAP. IV. part of the French army, glaringly marked
1808. throughout by blunder and imbecility.* Certain
July. it is, that the moral influence of these events in
Valencia, was felt throughout Spain, and gave
additional nerve and vigour to the popular re-
sistance.

* While we venture to impugn the military talents of Marshal Moncey, it is only justice to place on record the following unexceptionable testimony to his moral worth. "We know," says the President of the Junta of Oviedo, "that this illustrious General detests the conduct of his companions. We offer him the tribute of truth and honour; and we invite this generous soldier to aid us, by the addition of his talents and bravery. If the respect which he pays to the mandates of nature, do not permit him to take up arms against his unworthy companions, yet he shall be considered by us as a just and honourable man, and our love and our esteem shall follow him wherever, in the vicissitudes of life, his lot shall be cast."

His must be a low ambition, who does not consider such a tribute, given in such circumstances, as above the value of military fame.

CHAPTER V.

OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA.

IN Andalusia the French arms were destined to sustain yet deeper disaster and disgrace. In no part of Spain was resistance to the authority of the intrusive government more general and formidable. Castanos, who commanded the Spanish army stationed at St. Roque, had early opened a communication with the Governor of Gibraltar; and from that fortress had been furnished with supplies of money, arms, ammunition, and equipment. The surrender of the squadron of Rossilly, and the arrival of the auxiliary force of General Spencer, added new vigour to the measures of popular resistance. The efforts of the Supreme Junta, though

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CHAP. V. marked occasionally by indiscretion, were, on

1808. the whole, vigorous and judicious ; and it was
June. already apparent that the reduction of Andalusia
would at least be preceded by an obstinate and
severe struggle.

The necessity of immediate measures for the invasion of this important province, appears somewhat tardily to have occurred to Murat. The danger of the fleet, then in harbour at Cadiz, was a circumstance not at all contemplated at Madrid ; and the Supreme Junta had, in a great measure, succeeded in exciting the ardour, and organizing the efforts of the people, before the internal tranquillity of the province was disturbed by the appearance of an enemy.

At length decided steps were taken for the invasion of Andalusia. The command of the force destined for this service, was intrusted to General Dupont, who had hitherto remained inactive in the neighbourhood of Toledo. On the twenty-fourth of May, that officer commenced his march, with a column consisting of General Barbou's division of infantry, six thousand strong ; two brigades of cavalry, commanded by General Fresia ; five hundred marines of the Imperial Guard ; two Swiss regiments in the

service of Spain ; and twenty-four pieces of artillery. In addition to this force, General Dupont was to be joined by a detachment from Junot's army ; and he received orders to collect and take with him whatever Spanish troops he might find in the neighbourhood of his route.

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The French army crossed the plains of La Mancha and the chain of the Sierra Morena, without encountering any obstacle in the hostility of the inhabitants. On his arrival at Andujar, General Dupont received information that the whole province was in arms, and that General Avril, whom Junot had detached to his assistance, had been compelled, by the appearance of a British force, to make a retrogressive movement on Lisbon.

Jun. 2.

Alarmed by this unpleasant intelligence, Dupont wrote instantly to Madrid, demanding reinforcements, and took such precautions as circumstances seemed to require for the safety of his army. On the sixth he passed the Guadalquivir, by the bridge of Andujar, and on the left bank of the stream continued his march to Alcolea, where the river is again crossed by the road.

Jun. 6.

In front of the bridge at Alcolea, Dupont, for

CHAP. V. **the first time, encountered a Spanish force. It**

1808. **was commanded by Don Agostino Echevarria,**
June. **and amounted to about three thousand regulars,**
with the addition of four or five thousand of the
armed peasantry of the neighbouring villages.
The bridge was fortified by works hastily con-
structed, and a battery of twelve cannon on the
right bank of the river.

Dupont advanced instantly to the assault ; and driving back the Spanish cavalry and infantry on the left bank, stormed the works of the bridge, and, crossing at full speed, gained possession of the village of Alcolea, and of several waggons of ammunition. Echevarria again rallied his troops on the Cordova road, but on the approach of the French cavalry recommenced his retreat.

On the evening of the same day, the French army reached Cordova. General Foy shall describe the scene which followed.

“ The French arrived at three in the afternoon, eager to enter those ancient walls which were partly constructed by the Romans, and partly by the Moors. Some musquet shots fired from the tops of the towers increased the irritation of the victors. General Dupont invested the city, and expected to become master of it with-

out a blow. The Prior of a Convent in the suburbs was despatched with pacific proposals to the inhabitants. He presented himself at the gate, but was denied admission. In this city of thirty-five thousand souls, deserted by its magistrates, without recognized leader, stunned by the cries of imprudent men, who rushed on danger while endeavouring to avoid it, several hours would have been necessary to restore tranquillity. The citizens were incapable of hearing. The French General imagined they would not hear. He ordered cannon to be brought up. In a few minutes the new gate was broken open, and the troops were let loose on the city. To some shots which were fired accidentally from the windows, they replied by continued volleys of musquetry. Men in arms, and others who were defenceless, were killed in the streets; churches, houses, even the celebrated Mosque, which the Christians had converted into a cathedral—all were pillaged. The ancient capital of the Omniade Caliphs, the favourite abode of the Abderamans—the greatest monarchs that ever filled the throne of Spain—now witnessed the renewal of scenes of horror, such as it had never seen since the year 1236,

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CHAP. V. when the Moors were driven from it by Ferdinand III. King of Castile and Leon: *dreadful scenes for which no excuse was to be found in the loss sustained by the victors, since the attack of the city had not cost them ten men, and the success of the day only thirty killed and eighty wounded !*"

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Such—detailed in language honourable to the writer—were the gratuitous atrocities perpetrated at Cordova by Dupont, whose cruelty and incapacity contributed in no ordinary degree to disgrace the arms of his country. Amid the unpleasant views of human nature, to which the contemplation of such scenes can scarcely fail to give rise, it is consoling to discover how generally cruelty of disposition is united to weakness of understanding, and that the higher qualities of intellect have a natural affinity with purity of principle and generosity of feeling.*

* In contrast with the account given of this inhuman butchery by General Foy—who will scarcely be suspected of exaggerating the atrocities of his countrymen,—we beg to subjoin that of Colonel Napier. "As the inhabitants took no part in the contest," says that officer, "and received the French without any signs of aversion, *the town was protected from pillage!* and Dupont, fixing ~~his~~ quarters there, sent his patrols as far as Ecija, without meeting with an enemy."

It is only necessary to add, that the preceding statement is given by Colonel Napier, *without any quotation of authority!*

The difficulties of Dupont were in no degree diminished by the conquest and massacre of Cordova. The intelligence he received from Cadiz informed him of the surrender of Rossilly. He learned, also, that Castanos, and the army under his command, had declared in favour of the Constitution, and were advancing to invest his position ; and that the passes of the Sierra were occupied by bodies of armed smugglers, which cut off his communication with Madrid.* Under these circumstances, Dupont judged it prudent again to retire on Andujar, where he took up his position on the nineteenth. On his arrival, a detachment was immediately ordered to attack a band of insurgent peasantry at Jaen, which, by pressing on his out-posts, and cutting off his detachments, had occasioned considerable

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Jun. 19.

* The following extract, from an intercepted letter of Dupont to General Beliard, gives a striking picture of the difficulties with which he felt himself to be surrounded at this period. " We have not a moment to lose in quitting a position where we cannot exist. The soldier, all day under arms, cannot, as hitherto, reap the corn and make bread ; and all the peasantry have forsaken their homes. For Heaven's sake send us prompt assistance,—send us a strong body of troops,—send us, without delay, medicines and linen for the wounded ; for the enemy, for a month past, have intercepted all our ammunition, our wag-gons, and our provisions, from Toledo."

CHAP. V. annoyance. This service was performed with
1808. success; the town of Jaen was pillaged, and
June. many of its inhabitants massacred, but the detachment returned without having been able to procure a supply of provisions to relieve the necessities of the army. The war on both sides had become one of barbarous and wanton cruelty. The people sought vengeance for the massacre of Cordova; and they found it. All prisoners that fell into their hands were murdered. At Manzanares, they assaulted the hospital and massacred the sick. General René was siezed at Carolina, and thrown alive into a caldron of boiling water. Other officers were sawn in twain. The war of the most savage tribes could not exceed in guilt and cruelty, the contest of these two *civilized* and *Christian* nations.

Foy.

While at Andujar, Dupont was at length joined by the expected reinforcements from Madrid; and was enabled to muster in the field nearly twenty thousand men. But even with this force he still continued inactive. Had he advanced to Seville, or at once determined on evacuating the province, there can be little doubt that, in either case, his operations

would have been attended by comparative suc- CHAP. V.
 cess. Had Seville not been his object he ought
 never to have advanced to Cordova. Nothing
 had occurred after his march from Andujar,
 which should have had any influence in chang-
 ing his resolution. To remain at Cordova was
 to court defeat, to suffer himself to be hemmed
 in by the insurgent armies, to submit volun-
 tarily to the evils of a blockade. Seville was
 the chief focus of the insurrection ; it contained
 abundant supplies, possessed a wealthy popula-
 tion, and, by attacking it, Dupont would have
 aimed a blow at the very heart which had occa-
 sioned a strong insurrectionary pulsation through
 every member of the kingdom.

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On the other hand, there were no obstacles of
 any serious magnitude to interrupt his retreat.
 The passes of the Sierra were occupied only by
 bands of peasants and smugglers, unequal to sus-
 tain the assault of regular troops ; and, in the
 plains of La Mancha, he might have awaited the
 arrival of such reinforcements as would have en-
 abled him successfully to encounter the insur-
 gent forces.

But such views, though they might have had
 some influence with any ordinary general, had

CHAP. V. none with Dupont. With the main-body of the
1808. army he remained at Andujar; and the division
June. of General Vedel was advanced to Baylen, with
the view of maintaining, uninterrupted, the communication with La Mancha. In the choice of his position, Dupont displayed little military judgment. It commanded indeed the main road from Seville to Madrid, but was liable to be turned at many points, in the season when the Guadalquiver became fordable; and at all seasons by the bridge of Marmolexo, about two leagues lower down the river, and by the ferry of Mengibar, about twice that distance higher up. Works, however, were erected for the defence of the bridge at Andujar; and Dupont, blind to the real perils of his position, evidently anticipated that this would become the chief object of the enemy's attack.

The enemy were not idle. Their commander was Don Francisco Xavier de Castanos, a general devoid neither of talent nor experience, and destined to play a conspicuous part in the progress of that war of which we have already traced the commencement. Vigorous preparations were making in Andalusia and the neighbouring provinces to attack Dupont; and the circle from

which the supplies of the French army could be drawn was becoming gradually more confined. A body of the insurgents from Grenada had advanced to Jaen, and were preparing to move on Carolina. It was necessary these should be dispersed; and General Cassagne, with a brigade of Vedel's division, was ordered to advance for this purpose. General Cassagne was successful in his attack on the insurgents, whom he routed after a severe engagement; yet he did not return to Baylen without considerable loss, and a fame blackened by the perpetration of the most horrible enormities.

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In the meanwhile, the organization of fresh troops was proceeding without intermission at Seville. Every hour of delay was bringing fresh accessions of strength to the Spanish army. The inaction of the French army—naturally attributed to timidity—gave new confidence both to the leaders and the people. The army of Castanos, formed into four divisions, was gradually approaching the French army, and narrowing the sphere of its influence on the surrounding country. The first division, commanded by General Reding, was, in number, about ten thousand, and formed the right of the army. The

- CHAP. V. second, about six thousand strong, was led by
1808. the Marquis de Coupigny, a Frenchman by birth,
July. who had served in the Walloon Guards. The
third division, and the reserve, under Don Felix
Jones, an Irish refugee, and Don Manuel de la
Pena, amounted, together, to about ten thousand
men. On the ninth of July, it occupied
Jul. 9. a position extending from Carpio to Porcunas.
On the eleventh, the scheme of operations
against Dupont was concerted in a council
of war. At this meeting, it was arranged that
Reding's division should cross the Guadalquiver
at Mengibar, and advance on Baylen; that Coupigny
should proceed, by Villa Nueva and La
Hiquereta, to support the operations of Reding;
and that the remainder of the army, under Castanos,
should attack the enemy's position in
front simultaneously with the meditated advance
on his rear by Reding and Coupigny. The light
troops were directed to cross by Marmolexo,
and gain possession of the passes of the Morena
leading to Estremadura.
- Jul. 13. On the thirteenth, Reding advanced to Mengibar, and, by a gallant attack, drove the enemy from the *tete-du-pont*, and established himself in the village, which, on the appearance of Vedel's

division, he judged it prudent to evacuate. On the fourteenth, the force of Coupigny appeared in the neighbourhood of Villa Nueva, and a continued skirmish took place during the day. On the fifteenth, Castanos occupied in force the heights of Arjonilla, and opened an immediate fire with his artillery on the bridge of Andujar. Dupont was deceived by this. He imagined the attack would be made in that quarter, and disposed his army accordingly. The Spanish light infantry, under Colonel Cruz, crossed near Marmolexo, and made an attack on the rear of the French army. This was speedily repelled. Cruz retired with his skirmishers; and Castanos, who had made a simultaneous demonstration in front of the enemy, returned to his position.

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The circumstances of his situation appeared, however, to Dupont to become hourly more alarming; and, ignorant of the occurrences at Mengibar, he directed Vedel to despatch a brigade to his assistance. Vedel, who had been strengthened by the arrival of Gobert's brigade at Baylen, either did not understand the order of his leader, or did not choose to obey it. On the evening of the fifteenth,

CHAP. V. he set out for Andujar with his whole division,

1808. leaving only a small body, under General Leger
July. Bellair, to defend the village and ferry of Mengibar.

Reding took advantage of this. On the morning of the sixteenth he sent forward his skirmishers as if intending to gain possession of the boats, while the main-body of his army crossed the river, about half a league above, at the ford of Rincon. The French immediately retreated. Jul. 16. Reding followed up his success, and drove them in confusion from point to point till the arrival of Gobert, who, on hearing of the attack, advanced immediately from Baylen. The arrival of this reinforcement retarded, though it did not stop, the progress of the assailants. General Gobert was killed. The French were driven back into Baylen; and Reding, carrying with him a piece of artillery, and all the baggage of the detachment, retired to Mengibar. On the following day he crossed the Guadalquiver, and effected a junction with Coupigny.

No sooner had Dupont received intelligence of these events, than, instead of concentrating his force at Andujar, he ordered Vedel to return on the night following to Baylen, and, uniting

his force with that of General Darfour, who had succeeded Gobert in the command, again to drive the Spaniards across the Guadalquivir. Before his arrival, Darfour had retired to Carolina, in consequence of a report that a body of the Spanish army were advancing on that town by the Linhares road. Vedel was naturally astonished at the sudden and unexpected evacuation of this important post, but relying on the accuracy of Darfour's intelligence, he followed the movement of that general, and likewise fell back to Carolina.

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Reding, thus left without an enemy in his front, advanced successively to Baylen and the neighbourhood of Andujar, where he took up a position in rear of the French army, ready to take part in the anticipated attack of Castanos.

Dupont's illusion respecting the strength of his position was at length dispelled. Taking every precaution to conceal his intention from the enemy, he abandoned Andujar on the night of the eighteenth, carrying with him the pillage of the city. By day-dawn he had advanced about five leagues on the road to Baylen, when his advanced-guard came in contact with the Spanish out-posts. Reding, ignorant of the motions of


Jul. 19.

CHAP. V. his adversary, was at that moment forming his
1808. columns of attack on Andujar. The appearance
July. of the French army took him wholly by surprise,
yet all his arrangements were made with prompti-
tude and skill. Reding had formed his army on
the acclivity of a hill, rugged, intersected by deep
ravines, and covered with plantations of olive.
Dupont resolved at once on attack. It was ab-
solutely necessary that he should recover Baylen,
and re-open the communication with the scattered
divisions of his army. He saw at last that the
chances of a battle were less formidable than the
evils of continued inaction, and determined on
the adoption of that policy which, at an earlier
period, would probably have been productive of
a happier issue.

Dupont halted his advanced-guard, and waited
for the coming up of his army, a large propor-
tion of which, encumbered by plunder, were yet a
great way in the rear. Reding lost no time in
attacking that portion of the French army
already opposed to his division, and opened on
them a destructive fire from all his artillery.
The French cavalry at length came up, and were
ordered instantly to charge. They did so with
distinguished gallantry, but without success.

SKETCH
of the
(Battle of)
BAYLEN.

English Miles



General Dupré was killed in an attack on the Walloon Guards; and though the Spaniards at first lost ground, the cavalry were eventually repulsed with considerable loss.

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On the right of the line the Swiss battalions of either army were brought into conflict. Here the battle was waged on both sides with great vigour and pertinacity. Victory at length declared for the Spaniards. The French were driven back through the whole extent of their line, and were compelled to abandon their artillery.

Fresh reinforcements, however, were continually arriving to the French army from the rear. These, with singular want of judgment, Dupont pushed forward into action as they arrived, thus affording to the enemy an opportunity they did not neglect, of beating his whole army in detail. A marine battalion of the Imperial Guard, which belonged to the reserve of the army, at length came up and overthrew the enemy opposed to it with singular gallantry. A general charge was made by the cavalry, which broke for a moment the Spanish line. But it was found impossible to

CHAP. V. drive the Spaniards from their ground ; and the

1808. efforts of the French army gradually slackened.

July. Under these circumstances, two Swiss battalions in the French service, which had already distinguished themselves in the action, went over to the enemy. The troops, fatigued by a long night march, and exhausted by the burning rays of the sun, were unequal to further exertion ; and Dupont, having failed in battle, determined to try the chance of negotiation. This might have been more successful, had not the advance of the army of Castanos, under General La Pena, at that moment attacked the bridge on the Andujar road, which Barbou's brigade had been left to defend. On hearing the report of artillery in the rear, Reding, who had readily accepted Dupont's proposal of an armistice, with the view to the arrangement of a convention, became at once aware of the advantages of his situation, and of the extent of the difficulties by which the French army was surrounded. In the new view thus afforded him of the situation of the armies, he declined the responsibility of granting any terms, and referred the bearer of Dupont's proposals to General Castanos, at Andujar.

